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THE PRICE OF AUCTION-BASED IPOS 







The initial public offering process is under assault.  Critics of this 
process have woven a complex set of interconnected objections to the 
orthodox method for conducting IPOs, pricing of shares, and allocating 
them to preferred investors.  These critics instead point to online 
auctions as an alternative IPO method that can provide more equitable 
access, efficient prices, and egalitarian allocations.  These claims rest on 
Google’s recent IPO and W.R. Hambrecht + Co.’s OpenIPO mechanism, 
conventionally regarded as impure variants of what is known as a 
descending-bid or Dutch auction (Dutch IPO). 
This article assesses the empirical and theoretical case for Dutch 
IPOs.  Google’s IPO featured peculiarities that delimit its utility as a 
case study.  Instead this article novelly presents underpricing data on all 
OpenIPOs, as well as data about a French variant known as the Mise en 
Vente.  The results fail to vindicate Dutch IPO supporters’ primary 
claims, which perilously rely upon observations from the anomalous two-
year internet bubble period.  Moreover, economic and financial analyses 
of Dutch IPOs reveal ways in which they may be susceptible to fraud that 
bookbuilding is not.  Ultimately, claims of the Dutch IPO's superiority 
over bookbuilding at best are unproven and at worst fail to appreciate 
certain risks. 
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The initial public offering (IPO) process is under assault.  Since the 
1970s the number of IPOs has increased each and every decade,1 
averaging more than one each business day and raising approximately 
$523 billion over the past quarter-century.2  During this period 
underpricing, or the spread between a stock’s initial offering price and its 
closing price after the first day of trading,3 has averaged 17.4 percent,4 
and issuers have left approximately $120 billion on the table.5  
Underpricing is thus commonplace, which perhaps has contributed to it 
being accepted as a rational practice.6  This acceptance, however, turned 
into apprehension during the internet bubble period; from 1999 to 2000 
IPOs were underpriced on average by a dizzying 63.3 percent,7 leaving a 
staggering total of $62.4 billion on the table,8 or over half of the amount 
left during past quarter-century.9 
                                                          
1 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (Table 1, U.S. IPO Returns, 1980-
2005).  This article uses data over a twenty-six year span beginning in 1980, an 
admittedly arbitrary starting point.  The more logical time to begin is September, 1978, 
when Regulation A was amended to increase the registration requirement for IPOs from 
$500,000 to $1.5 million, but most analyses and data sets are limited to post-1980 IPOs. 
2 Jay R. Ritter, Some Factoids About the 2005 IPO Market 2, 9 (Jan. 27, 2006) tbls. 
1 & 7, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/work_papers/Some%20Factoids%20about%20the% 
202004%20IPO%20Market.pdf. 
3 Catherine M. Daily et al., IPO Underpricing:  A Meta-Analysis and Research 
Synthesis, 27 ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  THEORY & PRACTICE 271, 272 (2003) (“Underpricing 
is used synonymously in the literature with initial returns; the greater the underpricing the 
higher the initial returns.”); see also infra note 76.  Underpricing precisely refers to a 
positive difference between a stock’s closing and offering prices, whereas overpricing 
refers to the inverse.  Imprecise usage of underpricing is tolerated, presumably because, 
“[w]hile instances of overpricing are common, studies of new issue pricing conclude that, 
on average, underwriters underprice new issues.”  Lynn A Stout, The Unimportance of 
Being Efficient:  An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities 
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 659 (1988). 
4 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (Table 1, U.S. IPO Returns, 1980-
2005).  See also Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOKS IN FINANCE:  
EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 1, 1 (2004) (“Underpricing has tended to fluctuate a 
great deal, averaging 21% in the 1960s, 12% in the 1970s, 16% in the 1980s, 21% in the 
1990s, and 40% in the four years since 2000 (reflecting mostly the tail-end of the late 
1990s internet boom).”). 
5 Ritter, supra note 2, at 9.  Underpricing is distinct from “money left on the table,” 
which is the aggregate amount of underpricing.  See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, Money Left on 
the Table in IPOs by Firm 1 (Jan. 26, 2006) (“The amount of money left on the table is 
defined as the difference between the closing price on the first day and the offer price, 
multiplied by the number of shares sold.”), http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/work_papers/ 
monew.pdf [hereinafter Ritter, Money Left by Firm]. 
6 See infra Part I.A.  But cf., e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance 
Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 23 (1993) 
(“When initial offering prices are compared with market prices over a longer time, it 
turns out that IPOs significantly underperform the market.”). 
7 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (Table 2, Internet Bubble IPO 
Returns, 1998-2001).  See also infra notes 151-159 and accompanying text. 
8 Ritter, supra note 2, at 2. 
9 See supra note 5. 
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When the bubble burst in 2001 that apprehension turned into anger.10  
Individual investors sustained estimated losses exceeding 90 percent of 
their IPO investments’ value.11  New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer proceeded to call out underwriters as running a sophisticated 
“con game” with issuers: 
When the analysts and investment bankers went to the 
CEOs [of issuers] they said . . . “you bring your 
underwriting to us, but we will give you, not the 
company, but individually IPO allocations to the tune of 
a few million bucks.” . . . . [T]he point is you had this 
incestuous ring from analyst to investment banker to 
CEO.  Now who is left out in this?  Who’s left out is the 
shareholder–folks like you and I who go out there and 
buy shares because the analyst says buy the stock. . . . 
They used to have a name for that, a Ponzi Scheme, 
right?  Isn’t that what it was?12 
The “hyperbolic rate” at which IPO underpricing had increased prompted 
John Coffee to assert that, “[w]hatever the traditional rationale for 
underpricing, that rationale no longer applies to current practices.”13 
The bubble’s aftermath prompted the SEC to commission a closer 
examination of the IPO process.14  Noting that “public confidence in the 
integrity of the IPO process had eroded significantly,”15 a blue-ribbon 
                                                          
10 Certainly a compounding factor was the medley of financial scandals that began 
with Enron’s disclosure of accounting irregularities, which intensified public scrutiny of 
customary business practices.  See generally Symposium, Enron and the Future of U.S. 
Corporate Law and Policy, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004). 
11 See, e.g., William Hambrecht, Fixing the IPO Process 3 (Sept. 2002), 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/bill_pov/200209/report.pdf. 
12 Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 801, 811-12 (2002) 
(Symposium:  Enron and Its Aftermath).  But see Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey 
MacIntosh,  Boom, Bust, and Litigation in Venture Capital Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 867, 868 (2004) (pointing alternatively to a perfect storm in which “the changing 
availability of IPOs and greatly enhanced IPO valuations combined to produce 
widespread and systematic pathologies in IPO exits . . . that led investment bankers and 
VCs to change their behavior in value-destructive ways”).  Ever politic, Spitzer did 
proceed to scale his statement back slightly by adding:  “It may be a little more subtle 
than that in terms of what was going on, but that is the essence of this dynamic and, it’s 
not right.”  Spitzer, supra, at 812. 
13 John C. Coffee, Jr., IPO Underpricing and Dutch Auctions, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 
1999, at 5.  As evidence Coffee cites the “staggering” amount of money left on the table 
against the amount of equity raised in the early part of the internet bubble.  Id. at 5-6.  But 
see infra notes 151-159 and accompanying text. 
14 See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A 
COMM. CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. AND NASD AT THE 
REQUEST OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION A-1 (May 2003) 
(Appendix A, Letter from Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman of Securities and Exchange 
Commission, to Richard Grass, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The New York 
Stock Exchange, Inc., and Robert R. Glauber, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
NASD, dated Aug. 22, 2002)  http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/ 
rules_regs/nasdw_010373.pdf [hereinafter IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT]. 
15 Id. at 1-2.  The committee was composed of prominent representatives from the 
academic, financial, legal, and securities exchange sectors.  Id. at i. 
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committee determined that a contributing factor to this erosion was “the 
widespread perception that IPOs are parceled out disproportionately to a 
few, favored investors, be they large institutions, powerful individuals or 
‘friends and family’ of the issuer,”16 a practice commonly called 
spinning.17 
Among the committee’s resultant recommendations was for the 
securities industry to develop alternatives to the orthodox bookbuilding 
method.18  Through face-to-face meetings and road show presentations,19 
underwriters conduct price discovery with prospective investors about an 
issuer’s offering.  Based on these investors’ level of interest, 
underwriters “build a book” of orders for stock and price it. 
Instead the committee endorsed further exploration of what is 
conventionally referred to as the Dutch auction IPO method (Dutch 
IPO).20  In lieu of the role underwriters play in bookbuilding a Dutch IPO 
utilizes an auction to conduct price discovery.  Prospective investors 
communicate via bids the number and price of shares demanded.  
Successful bids are determined by starting with the highest price and 
then moving downward until investor demand equals the total amount of 
securities offered, or the clearing price.21  All shares are awarded at the 
same price, which is based on the lowest successful bid;22 and excess 
demand for shares results in a pro rata distribution.  Accordingly, the 
Dutch IPO represents an alternate mechanism by which “pricing and 
                                                          
16 Id. at 2. 
17 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:  A Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 583, 586 (2004) (“’[S]pinning’ refers to the preferential allocation of the right to 
buy in an IPO.”).  Griffith’s argument, see infra Part I.B, utilizes a narrow conception of 
spinning that is restricted to only preferential “allocation decisions made by the managing 
underwriters and other members of the underwriting syndicate” since “the issuer’s 
allocation decision influence a miniscule proportion of the total offering,” Griffith, supra, 
at 586 & n.7.  Spinning, however, also can include preferential allocations to institutional 
investors, which is the broader conception used here. 
18 For an overview of the bookbuilding process, see generally Katrina Ellis et al., A 
Guide to the Initial Public Offering Process, 3 CORP. FIN. REV. 14 (1999).  See also infra 
notes 63-68 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra note 65. 
20 See, e.g., NASD, NASD Approves Rules to Reform IPO Process (Nov. 24, 2003) 
(indicating the NASD’s encouraged “use of auction systems, such as the Dutch auction 
system or a similar system to collect indications of interest to help establish the final IPO 
price”), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ss 
DocName=NASDW_002817 (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
21 See, e.g., Lucas C. Townsend, Comment, Can Wall Street’s “Global Resolution” 
Prevent Spinning?  A Critical Evaluation of Current Alternatives, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1121, 1163-64 (2004) (“Eventually, the issuer will arrive at the bid that depletes the 
shares in the offering.  This bid determines the ‘clearing price,’ which is the price that the 
accepted bidders will pay for their shares.”).  See also infra note 262 and accompanying 
text. 
22 Unsuccessful bidders receive nothing.  In theory a pure Dutch IPO would set the 
final offering price equal to the clearing price.  In practice issuers conduct a modified 
Dutch auction in which they have discretion to set the clearing price, which may or may 
not be equal to the lowest bid as well as the final offering price.  See infra notes 260-267, 
274-276, and accompanying text. 
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allocation are removed from the realm of issuer and underwriter 
discretion. . . . IPOs conducted through a true auction model should not 
experience the enormous aftermarket price spikes that fueled the abuses 
of the bubble period.”23  While refusing to endorse the Dutch IPO as a 
replacement for the bookbuilding method,24 the committee concluded 
that auctions might be an intriguing way to promote more accurate and 
transparent IPO pricing.25 
That intrigue found its way to Sergey Brin and Larry Page, the 
iconoclastic co-founders of Google, Inc. (Google).26  In August, 2004 the 
company ruffled Wall Street’s feathers by announcing that its widely-
anticipated offering would be a Dutch IPO.27  Brin and Page justified 
their decision to utilize this unorthodox method by stating: 
It is important to us to have a fair process for our IPO 
that is inclusive of both small and large investors.  It is 
also crucial that we achieve a good outcome for Google 
and its current shareholders.  This has led us to pursue an 
auction-based IPO for our entire offering.  Our goal is to 
have a share price that reflects an efficient market 
valuation of Google that moves rationally based on 
changes in our business and the stock market.28 
The co-owners thus believed that a Dutch IPO would be a more efficient 
and fair way to go public than bookbuilding. 
That belief never materialized for Google.  Just days before going 
public, the company lowered the final offering price by exercising a 
largely unnoticed right to value the stock as Google and its underwriters 
saw fit.29  By most accounts this was a shrewdly calculated move to 
generate market enthusiasm for an otherwise sloppily executed IPO.30  
                                                          
23 IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT, supra note 14, at 9; see also Coffee, supra note 
13, at 5 (opining that an auction represents the “logical counter-reaction” to underpricing 
and spinning).  But see generally Alexander P. Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 
IPO Allocations:  Discriminatory or Discretionary?, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 167 (2002) (finding 
that discretionary IPO allocation policies are generally beneficial for issuers, institutional 
investors, and investment bankers). 
24 See IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT, supra note 14, at 9 (“The market, and not 
regulators, should determine whether a Dutch auction or another method is desirable for a 
particular IPO.”). 
25 Notably, the committee did not regard the Dutch IPO method as a way to 
eliminate abusive allocation practices.  See id. at 3, 10-13. 
26 See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
27 Google, however, was not the first firm to conduct a Dutch IPO.  See infra note 
296 and accompanying text. 
28 Google, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1 Registration Statement 31 (filed with 
SEC on Aug. 18, 2004) (Letter from the Founders:  “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s 
Shareholders) [hereinafter Google, Amended Form S-1], available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/ds1a.htm. 
29 See id. at 34 (“Understand that we may modify the price range and the size of our 
offering multiple times in response to investor demand.”). 
30 Kevin J. Delaney, Google IPO Revisited:  Insiders Got Choice Other Sellers 
Didn’t, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2005, at A11 (referencing “a string of events in the spring 
and summer of 2004, including Google missteps, [that] cooled some investors’ thirst for 
its shares”); see also infra notes 270-271 and accompanying text. 
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The move worked.  During the first day of public trading Google’s 
shares changed hands 22 million times and appreciated in value 18.1 
percent,31 exceeding the average for traditional IPOs during that year as 
well as during the past twenty-five years.32  Moreover, the auction left 
many bidders frustrated with mysteriously low allocations.33  By most 
accounts Google’s IPO largely failed to deliver on the efficient and 
egalitarian objectives that initially had made it the darling of the 
investing public.34  Google’s experience may be, at best, a cautionary tale 
of how not to conduct a Dutch IPO,35 and, at worst, an incomplete 
catalog of problems that can plague this alternative IPO method. 
None of this, however, has deterred support for Dutch IPOs.  
Commentators instead have stylized Google as a negative case study: 
Had the Google IPO been viewed as an unambiguous 
success, there is no doubt that it would have been 
followed by a flood of additional Dutch auction IPOs. . . 
. I expect to see noteworthy Dutch auction IPOs 
executed in the future, though at a slower rate of 
adoption than if the outcome had been an indisputable 
triumph.  In my opinion, the future use of the Dutch 
auction for IPOs was never predicated on the success of 
this particular deal.36 
                                                          
31 See infra notes 278-279 and accompanying text (Table 3, Google IPO Returns, 
2004-2005). 
32 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (Table 1, IPO Returns, 1980-2005). 
33 See, e.g., Tom Petruno, Some Investors Feel Shorted by Google, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2005, at C1 (“‘We were frustrated about our allocation of shares,’ which amounted to 
about 25% fewer shares than the firm hoped its winning bid would have brought it . . . .”) 
(quoting Connor Browne, portfolio manager at Thornburg Investment Management). 
34 See, e.g., Andrew Wahl, ‘To Google’ Has New Meaning, 77 CAN. BUS. 21, 21 
(2004) (“Rather than being a catalyst for other dot-com IPOs and the tech market in 
general, though, Google over-promised, underperformed, and taught everyone, including 
themselves, some good lessons.”).  Not everyone, however, believes Google’s IPO was a 
failure.  William R. Hambrecht, established advocate of the Dutch IPO, has opined that:  
“‘I think it worked,’ he said.  ‘Think about Google’s objectives.  It wanted its 100 million 
user base to have access to its IPO and it did that.  It wanted to get rational price 
discovery, and it did that too.’”  Joseph Nocera, Two Cheers for the Google IPO, 150 
FORTUNE 42, 42 (Sept. 6, 2004) (quoting William R. Hambrecht); cf. Victor Fleischer, 
Brand New Deal:  The Google IPO and the Branding Effect of Corporate Deal 
Structures, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 20) (“Despite [ ] 
apparent inefficiencies, the Google IPO was a success on its own terms.  The IPO became 
a branding moment for Google. . . . From a corporate finance perspective, the deal was at 
best mediocre.  From a marketing perspective, it was simply brilliant.”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=790928. 
35 See infra Part III.A. 
36 Laurie Simon Hodrick, Google’s IPO:  A Dutch Auction Works, If You Let It, 
HERMES 1 (Fall 2004); see also Lessons of Google’s Dutch Auction, 
http://www.alwayson-network.com/comments.php?id=P5476_0_6_0_C (Aug. 20, 2004)  
(quoting Jay R. Ritter, a finance professor who recommended the Dutch IPO method to 
Google and advised it) (“Is the world any different because Google chose to use a Dutch 
auction instead of relying on the more traditional approach through investment banks?  
Believe it or not, Ritter doesn’t think so. . . . A difference that makes no difference is not 
a difference. . . . Ritter believes the Dutch auction was a success in that it was not a 
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Similarly, while conceding that Google “did not unleash the power of a 
true Dutch auction to create market pricing for the original IPO shares,”37 
some have maintained that “[w]ithout having Google go public in an 
alternative universe, critics cannot say decisively that the auction 
mechanism failed because it underpriced the offering.”38  The hope, 
according to these Dutch IPO proponents, is that “powerful issuers such 
as Google can help force the market for underwriting IPOs adapt to a 
more issuer-friendly system,” a “new paradigm” of online IPO auctions 
to replace the traditional bookbuilding method.39 
The case for shifting to this alternate IPO method rests on three 
tenets.  First, a Dutch IPO represents a more democratic process by 
providing all investors, individual or institutional, with an opportunity to 
purchase shares before they debut on the market.40  Second, a Dutch IPO 
                                                                                                                                  
failure.”); infra Part III.B.  A few months earlier, however, Hodrick evidently saw 
Google’s IPO quite differently:  “Potentially this IPO is incredibly important. . . . If it is 
deemed a success, it really opens a new avenue for issuing equity.”  European Investors 
Shut Out of Google IPO, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1284420,00.html (Mar. 8, 
2004). 
37 Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 711, 768-69 (2005) [hereinafter Hurt, Moral Hazard].  In a subsequent article Hurt 
seemingly distances herself from this position, obliquely referencing “[m]any detractors 
of the traditional bookbuilding mechanism [that] declared that the Google auction 
foreshadowed an upheaval in the cliquish investment bank industry.”  Christine Hurt, 
What Google Can’t Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And What It Can), 37 TOLEDO L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=753625 
[hereinafter Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us].  Hurt likens Google’s auction to “Harry 
Potter’s mirror at Hogwarts that shows the observer what the observer wants to see.”  Id. 
(manuscript at 36).  The problem, as Hurt acknowledges, is that “in the year since the 
Google auction, only two other issuers have launched an online IPO.”  Id.; see also infra 
notes 308-310 and accompanying text (Table 4, OpenIPO Returns, 1999-2005).  With the 
benefit of this hindsight, Hurt perforce concedes that Google’s auction “cannot be used to 
herald an immediate sea change in the bookbuilding IPO market.”  Hurt, What Google 
Can’t Tell Us, supra (manuscript at 1).  Nevertheless, like Hodrick, Hurt believes a silver 
auction lining exists within Google’s dark IPO cloud, suggesting that it “will only assist 
other issuers in negotiating with underwriters for alternative offering mechanisms.”  Id. 
38 Id. (manuscript at 28).  But see generally Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, 
Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517 (2004) (cautioning 
against casual use of counterfactual thought experiments as causal hypotheses).  
Commentators are divided about whether the bookbuilding method would have generated 
a different result for Google.  Compare, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 34 (manuscript at 19) 
(“If Google had done a traditional IPO, the offering price would likely have been 
higher.”), with Hodrick, supra note 36, at 1 (“It is important to note that many of the 
hurdles faced in the Google IPO would still have been problematic had Google instead 
chosen to use a standard firm commitment underwriting. . . . These challenges, and not 
the Dutch auction, were sources of downward pressure on the offer’s demand.”). 
39 Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 789; see also id. at 765 n.300 (citing 
approvingly Carolyn Said, Quattrone’s Trial:  A Catalyst for Change, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 
26, 2003, at I1 (describing Google’s Dutch auction IPO as reflective of the shift in 
Silicon Valley to “a new world order” and not the “favoritism and cronyism” of 1999)). 
40 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that “individual investors should 
prefer Dutch Auctions, and a significant ‘democratization’ of the IPO process can be 
envisioned”); Hambrecht, supra note 11, at 2 (advocating greater access to all 
institutional and retail investors through IPOs that “would provide a broader universe of 
potential buyers” and “create a level playing field to match supply and demand”). 
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is a more equitable method by eliminating preferential allocations and 
awarding one offering price to all successful bidders.41  And, finally, a 
Dutch IPO produces a more accurate price by utilizing bids to obtain 
actual investor valuations efficiently.42  These rationales sustain a belief 
that an auction-based IPO is the “logical offering procedure for issuers 
who are pursuing the twin goals of minimizing their cost of capital and 
obtaining a shareholder base.”43  Specifically, Dutch IPOs are believed to 
provide “a more transparent IPO process” and “a more efficient market 
for IPOs,” which will “transform the IPO process” and ultimately lead to 
“elimination of the bookbuilding method.”44 
This article cautions against such belief.  Part I scrutinizes criticisms 
of bookbuilding that revolve around the dual phenomena of underpricing 
and spinning.  Critics regard underpricing as a form of inefficiency that 
flows from an agency problem.45  This account, however, sidesteps the 
more dominant account of underpricing as compensation that flows from 
asymmetrical information.  Critics also have asserted a link between 
underpricing and spinning, in which the former phenomenon feeds into 
the latter.46  This link, however, relies on limited data and largely 
dissolves in the face of new and proposed regulations.  Additionally, 
both sets of criticisms perilously fashion policy prescriptions from 
anecdotal and statistical evidence based on the brief internet bubble 
period, which involved anomalous dynamics that do not apply to the 
current market. 
                                                          
41 See, e.g., Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 769; Hurt, What Google Can’t 
Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 8) (same).  See also W.R. Hambrecht + Co., 
OpenIPO:  How It Works, http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/index. 
html# (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) (“Shares are allocated in an equal and impartial way by 
the auction process.  There is no preferential allocation. . . . All individual and 
institutional investors pay the same price per share.”). 
42 See, e.g., Shane Kite, Google Goes Dutch, Rocking IPO Sector, 17 BANK TECH. 
NEWS 27, 27 (Aug. 2004) (“Dutch auctions, say supporters, offer a truer price based on 
more accurate demand of a wider market, because the issuance is open to any potential 
shareholder with an Internet connection, instead of select institutional accounts favored 
by individual underwriters.”).  See also Google, Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 31 
(justifying decision to go public with an auction-based IPO because it would generate “a 
share price that reflects an efficient market valuation of Google”). 
43 Coffee, supra note 13, at 5. 
44 Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 714, 769.  Hurt argues that the root of these 
evils is the bookbuilding method:  “If the bookbuilding approach is eliminated, all of the 
abuses of that system will be eliminated as well.  The underwriter would have no ability 
to underprice and no ability to handpick beneficiaries of built-in profit.”  Id.; see also 
infra Part I.A.  To be sure, commentators have been attacking bookbuilding and 
underpricing for some time.  See, e.g., Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, 
Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REV. 965, 976-77 
(1995) (contending IPO pricing practices have “a serious negative impact on privately-
held companies that may wish to go public, as well as on securities firms that do 
underwritings”).  Since the internet bubble burst, however, dissatisfaction with the 
existing system has intensified and gained a larger audience. 
45 See infra Part I.A. 
46 See infra Part I.B. 
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Part II delineates a well-known mechanism for bridging 
asymmetrical information problems, auctions.  A review of voluminous 
economic and financial literature reveals differences between the familiar 
English, or ascending-bid, and Dutch, or descending-bid, auctions.47  
Specifically, as compared to their English counterparts, Dutch auctions 
permit only a less dominant Nash strategy48 and may generate inferior 
revenue.  Additionally, a problem inherent in any auction is its 
susceptibility to fraud in the form of bidding rings.49  Although difficult 
to detect and undermine,50 such rings are remarkably effective in 
enforcing themselves. 
Part III evaluates the case for auction-based IPOs.  First, three data 
sets are presented to determine whether this alternative method is a 
superior way to eliminate or mitigate underpricing.51  The first data set is 
Google’s IPO, whose first-day and one-year returns far exceed that of all 
other IPOs over the same time period; various peculiarities about 
Google’s offering, however, make it a limited case study.  A far more 
comprehensive and instructive data set comes from a lesser known 
variant of descending-bid auctions known as the Mise en Vente, or 
French auction; like Google’s IPO, French auctions experience 
underpricing levels that on average compare unfavorably to bookbuilding 
in France and the U.S.  The final data set concerns OpenIPO, a patented 
online auction format by W.R. Hambrecht + Co. (Hambrecht);52 while 
generally outperforming traditional IPOs over the same timeframe, 
OpenIPOs tend to price shares less accurately in larger offerings and 
suffer from dramatic price changes over time.  Second, models and 
evidence are presented to demonstrate how auction-based IPOs are 
uniquely vulnerable to various manipulative strategies and bidding 
rings.53  Collectively, these empirical and theoretical analyses reveal the 
claims cited in support of the auction-based IPO to be more mythical 
than manifest. 
 
                                                          
47 See infra Part II.A. 
48 See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the 
Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERK. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 n.60 (“A 
party’s Nash strategy is the conditional best response to the opponent’s choice of strategy 
(i.e., it is the strategy that will make the player better off than all other courses of action, 
given the opponent’s move).”). 
49 See infra Part II.B. 
50 Cf. ROUNDERS (Miramax 1998) (“Listen, here’s the thing.  If you can’t spot the 
sucker in the first half hour at the table, then you are the sucker.”) (emphasis in original) 
(Matt Damon aka Mike McDermott). 
51 See infra Part III.A. 
52 See, e.g., Lisa Branstein & Nick Wingfield, New Company Aims to Shift IPO 
Playing Field, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1999, at C1.  See also infra note 296. 
53 See infra Part III.B. 
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I. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
 
Issuers overwhelmingly use the bookbuilding method to go public.  
Through road shows and meetings underwriters collect information from 
prospective investors to determine an offering price.  Correspondingly, 
the dominant metric for IPO performance is pricing.  Over the past 
twenty-five years the IPO shares were underpriced on average by 17.4 
percent.54  During the 1999-2000 internet bubble period, however, 
underpricing averaged 63.3 percent.55 
Since that bubble burst commentators have advanced complex 
criticisms of bookbuilding.  One strand charges underwriters as agents 
that underprice shares as part of a larger “pump-and-dump” scheme to 
benefit themselves and managers.  Another strand charges underpricing 
as part of a self-perpetuating cycle that involves spinning shares to 
certain investors.  This Part assesses these criticisms in light of empirical 
data, finance theory, and legal regulations. 
 
A. Underpricing Underwriters 
 
An IPO is a complex process.  Issuers go public predominantly to 
raise working capital as well as to generate prestige and publicity.56  
Going public also can appreciate a company’s net worth, permit 
expansion through acquisition of other businesses, and stimulate future 
financing opportunities.57  And raising public equity can be more 
attractive than leveraging the firm for loans, which may restrict its 
capacity to pursue high-risk and high-yield opportunities.58 
Though these objectives may vary, an IPO serves two primary 
constituencies.  An IPO facilitates the ability of an issuer’s shareholders 
to diversify their holdings and exit.59  And an IPO facilitates the ability 
                                                          
54 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (Table 1, IPO Returns, 1980-2005). 
55 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (Table 2, Internet Bubble IPO 
Returns, 1998-2001). 
56 See, e.g., JAMES B. ARKEBAUER WITH RON SCHULTZ, CASHING OUT:  THE 
ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC 4 (1991) (citing a 1985 study by John E. 
Young of 562 companies that went public, in which “the majority of CEOs cited [these] 
two fundamental reasons for going public”).  But see, e.g., Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A 
Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795, 1796 (2002) 
(“Nonfinancial reasons, such as increased publicity, play only a minor role for most 
firms” in their decision to go public.). 
57 See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.12[2], at 
104-05 (5th ed. 2005) (“Advantages of Going Public”). 
58 See, e.g., Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public?  An Empirical 
Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 39 (1998) (“By gaining access to the stock market and 
disseminating information to the generality of investors, a company elicits outside 
competition to its lender and ensure a lower cost of credit, a larger supply of external 
finance, or both . . . .”). 
59 See, e.g., DAVID P. SUTTON & M. WILLIAM BENEDETTO, INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS:  A STRATEGIC PLANNER FOR RAISING EQUITY CAPITAL 15 (1988) ( “Added 
financial stability from the raising of needed capital, is by far the most important reason 
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of an issuer’s managers to raise funds for new projects.60  These 
rationales are not mutually exclusive,61 but when they conflict, 
managerial pursuit of new projects dominates diversification of 
shareholder portfolios.62 
And managers clearly prefer the bookbuilding method for IPOs.  The 
vast majority of IPOs utilize underwritten financing,63 and 
overwhelmingly on a firm-commitment basis,64 whereby underwriters 
assume the risk of distribution.  During the registration waiting period 
underwriters conduct face-to-face meetings and road shows with 
prospective investors.65  Within these meetings and shows underwriters 
offer investors valuable information about the issuer in exchange for 
their superior information about private valuations, the issuer’s 
competition, and the market in general.66  This is because “investors have 
no incentive to reveal positive information before the stock is sold.”67  
                                                                                                                                  
for going public. . . . By going public, officers, directors, and early shareholders have a 
way of exiting from the company and knowing approximately what they will get.”). 
60 See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 57, § 3.12[2], at 105. 
61 Indeed, long-term shareholders may prefer reinvestment of an IPO’s proceeds 
over dividends, while managers conversely may prefer going public to divest themselves 
of some ownership in the firm.  See, e.g., Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 
15 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 195 (1986).  But see, e.g., Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 
721 (“[T]raditional IPO theory has not separated the founders from the issuer as an entity; 
however, the founders and the issuer may have different short-term interests in the IPO 
scenario.”). 
62 See, e.g., ARKEBAUER WITH SCHULTZ, supra note 56, at 5. 
63 See, e.g., Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 733 (“In the United States, the 
dominant method of distributing IPO shares is the bookbuilding method.”). 
64 See, e.g., LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 76 (3d ed. 
1998) (“For some time, the most prevalent type of underwriting has been the ‘firm 
commitment’ variety.”); Alexander, supra note 6, at 68 n.190 (noting that firm-
commitment underwritings “make up over 95% of IPOs”).  Alternatively, issuers may 
enlist underwriters on a best-efforts basis, which does not involve purchase of the issue 
and thus “is not really underwriting; it is simply merchandising.”  LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra, at 66; see also Ann E. Sherman, Best Efforts v. Firm Commitment Initial Public 
Offerings:  Evidence on the Market Feedback Theory, 2 REV. PAC. BASIN FIN. MKTS. & 
POLICIES 399 (1999) (finding that smaller and younger offerings tend to utilize best-
efforts underwritings). 
65 See, e.g., IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 (“Roadshows have 
traditionally been considered a key opportunity for large, primarily institutional, investors 
to gather additional information about IPO issuers, enjoy face-to-face exposure to senior 
management and learn management’s view of the most important aspects of the company 
and the offering.  Issuers and underwriters place great emphasis on roadshows, since 
roadshow attendees will likely constitute the bulk of the issuer’s shareholder base once 
the company has gone public.  Many large investors will not participate in IPOs unless 
they are provided an opportunity to meet and evaluate management during the 
roadshow.”). 
66 See, e.g., Rock, supra note 61, at 187 (suggesting that investors may be 
asymmetrically well-informed about extra-firm factors). 
67 Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine 
the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 344 (1989). 
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Underwriters then use this information to construct a demand curve that 
eventually results in an offering price.68 
Correspondingly, the most robust index of IPO performance is 
accurate pricing of shares.  Specifically, IPOs are evaluated by the spread 
between a share’s debut and closing prices on the first-day of trading.  
Table 1 summarizes IPO activity over the past twenty-six years: 
 
TABLE 1 








1980-84 219.2 7.6% 23.8% 
1985-89 256.8 6.0% 18.1% 
1990-94 340.2 11.2% 45.1% 
1995-99 487.0 28.1% 19.2% 
2000-04 158.0 33.1% (36.8)73 
2005 169.0 9.8% --- 
MEAN 287.9 17.4% 22.2% 
MEDIAN74 337.5 34.8% 31.2% 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., Daily et al., supra note 3, at 274 (“The road show is designed to gauge 
the anticipated demand for the firm’s stock and serves as a key input in the investment 
banker’s final determination of the price at which the firm’s stock will initially trade.”). 
69 Underpricing is hardly exclusive to domestic IPOs.  Indeed, “[w]ithin world 
markets the underpricing averages tend to be somewhat higher–a result that is often 
explained by differences in the perceived risk between domestic and international 
markets.”  Craig S. Galbraith et al., Offering Prospectuses, Competitive Strategies, and 
the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 31, 31-32 (2003).  See also 
infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
70 Data for 1980-2003 Offerings and Average First-Day Return from Ritter, supra 
note 2, at 9. 
71 The 1980-2003 data excludes American Depository Receipt, Best Efforts, Closed-
End Fund, Partnership, Real Estate Investment Trust, Regulation A, and Unit offerings as 
well as those with an offer price less than $5.00.  Ritter, supra note 2, at 9.  These 
exclusions are justified to create a data set comprised of “almost all IPOs of domestic 
operating companies that are large enough to be of interest to institutional investors.”  
Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed over Time?, 33 FIN. 
MGMT. 5, 12-13 (2004).  Moreover, the “smaller deals also have a lot of fraud, and 
account for most of the poor long-term performance.”  E-mail from Jay R. Ritter, Cordell 
Professor of Finance, University of Florida Warrington College of Business, to Peter B. 
Oh, Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (July 29, 2005) (on file 
with author).  The 2004-05 data does not include any offerings with an offer price less 
than $5.00. 
72 Data for Three-Year Return from Ritter, supra note 2, at 13.  This data excludes 
American Depository Receipt, Bank and S&L, Closed-End Fund, Real Estate Investment 
Trust, and Unit offerings as well as those with an offer price less than $5.00.  See Ritter, 
supra note 2, at 9. 
73 This is the three-year return from IPOs in 2000-02. 
74 The median for returns was calculated with absolute values. 
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Most studies of underpricing focus on the first-day returns as a superior 
gauge of an offering’s valuation.75  While hardly a perfect measure of an 
offering price’s accuracy,76 the average first-day return for IPOs was 6.8 
percent from 1980 to 1989, shot up to 21.1 percent from 1990 to 1999, 
and since 2000 has been 29.0 percent.77 
These statistics are rather distorted, however, by the 1999-2000 
internet bubble period.  During that brief two-year span there were 872 
IPOs with a staggering average first-day return of 63.3 percent.78  By 
way of contrast, the average first-day return was 14.7 percent from 1990 
to 1998, and has been 11.3 percent from 2001 to the present.79  
Examining the aggregate money issuers left on the table provides a 
similarly stark contrast.  Internet bubble issuers left $62.4 billion ($32.1 
billion per a year) on the table, whereas issuers left only $28.1 billion 
from 1990 to 1998 ($3.1 billion per a year), and a mere $11.6 billion 
from 2001 to 2005 ($2.3 billion per a year).80 
While simple to document, underpricing remains an enigmatic 
problem of asymmetrical information.  Empirical studies yield mixed 
results about what ex ante indicia correlate reliably with underpricing.81  
And commentators are divided over whether underpricing evinces that 
issuers have an informational advantage over prospective investors,82 or 
vice versa.83 
                                                          
75 See supra note 3. 
76 Irrational exuberance and macro-conditions are but some of the external factors 
that can affect how a stock does on the first day of trading.  Over time these factors and 
firm-related developments assume a more prominent role in explaining a stock’s price, 
and thus first-day returns represent a less distorted indicia of valuation. 
77 Different sets of offerings were excluded from the numbers for 2000-03 versus 
2004-05, and so comparisons between their average first-day returns are imperfect.  See 
supra notes 70-71. 
78 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (Table 2, Internet Bubble IPO 
Returns, 1998-2001). 
79 Ritter, supra note 2, at 9; see also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text 
(Table 1, U.S. IPO Returns, 1980-2005). 
80 Ritter, supra note 2, at 2; see also generally Ritter, Money Left by Firm, supra 
note 5, at 1; Jay Ritter, Money Left on the Table, by Year (Dec. 2003), 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/monyear.pdf [hereinafter Ritter, Money Left by Year].  The 
market for IPOs precipitously dropped from 2001 to 2003.  See supra notes 149-150 and 
accompanying text (Table 2, Internet Bubble IPO Returns, 1998-2001).  Perhaps a better 
measure is 2004, during which issuers left an aggregate $3.88 billion on the table.  
Regardless, at no recent time have IPO activity and underpricing been on a level even 
approaching that of the internet bubble period. 
81 See, e.g., Daily et al., supra note 3, at 272 (“While there is an extensive, and 
growing, body of empirical research investigating IPOs, the extant literature reveals little 
consistency in reported findings when focusing on the correlates of underpricing; i.e., 
those ex ante factors associated with underpricing.”). 
82 See generally Franklin Allen & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Signaling by Underpricing 
in the IPO Market, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 303 (1989). 
83 See, e.g., John A. Garfinkel, IPO Underpricing, Insider Selling and Subsequent 
Equity Offerings:  Is Underpricing a Signal of Quality?, 22 FIN. MGMT. 74 (1993). 
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Signaling theory provides a “dominant” positive account of IPO 
underpricing.84  Underpricing can be regarded as a manifestation of poor 
or deficient information about an offered stock’s value.85  To be sure, 
issuers and investors engage in some decision-making with imperfect 
information.86  Issuers, however, can combat such imperfections through 
observable and unique signals that convey a more accurate valuation of 
an issuer.87  Within the context of IPOs these signals primarily come in 
the form of the issuer’s prospectus,88 which provides investors insights 
into a firm, and thus reduces risk and speculation about the IPO.89 
Signaling theory also suggests a normative account of underpricing, 
where the most controversy exists.  Within the financial literature “there 
is little consensus regarding whether underpricing is a preferred or 
unwelcome outcome of the IPO process.”90  One interpretation of 
                                                          
84 Daily et al., supra note 3, at 276; see also id. at 275-76 (citing “the risk-averse 
underwriter hypothesis, the asymmetric information hypothesis, the band-wagon 
hypothesis, and the ownership dispersion hypothesis” as competing positive accounts of 
IPO underpricing).  Agency-based explanations of underpricing in particular have 
enjoyed some prominence.  See, e.g., Richard M. Robinson et al., Underpricing and IPO 
Ownership Retention, 28 J. ECON. & FIN. 132 (2004) (presenting empirical support for an 
agency-based explanation of IPO underpricing).  Even proponents of agency-based 
explanations, however, acknowledge that the “best established of these [theories of 
underpricing] are the asymmetric information based models.”  Ljungqvist, supra note 4, 
at 2; see also Ritter & Welch, supra note 56, at 1803 (“One way of classifying theories of 
underpricing is to categorize them on the basis of whether asymmetric information or 
symmetric information is assumed.”). 
85 See generally Stephen Ross, The Determinants of Financial Structure:  The 
Incentive Signaling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977). 
86 See, e.g., Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the 
“Bird in the Hand” Fallacy, 10 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 259 (1979) (examining cash 
dividends as signals of expected cash flows to investors with imperfect information).  
There is also a separate strand of studies about how issuers and investors engage in 
decision-making under uncertainty. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger 
Momentum:  Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249 
(2001) (describing overoptimism in issuers’ executives about mergers); Michael Hertzel 
et al., Long-Run Performance Following Private Placements of Equity, 57 J. FIN. 2595 
(2002) (describing overoptimism in investors about IPOs).  There are, however, serious 
reservations about the methodological soundness and practical consequences of such 
applications of behavioral theory.  For instance, Greg Mitchell has argued that: 
[A] great deal of psychological research . . . brings into question the 
claims of the [behavioral] theorists regarding the fallibility of 
judgment and decision making in experimental settings and qualifies 
the generalizations that can be safely drawn from this research. 
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of 
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1936 (2002); see 
also infra note 91. 
87 See generally A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL 
TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974). 
88 See generally Galbraith et al., supra note 69.  This version of signaling theory is 
premised on issuers having an information advantage over prospective investors. 
89 See, e.g., James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 
2005) (contending section 11 liability effectively provides shareholders with a put option 
on IPOs that allocates undue risk on issuers, who may act preemptively through 
deliberate underpricing and risk-spreading), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719768. 
90 Daily et al., supra note 3, at 274. 
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underpricing is that it manifests informational inefficiencies.91  This in 
turn has prompted some to advocate improved and increased 
disclosure.92 
But most of the criticism has been directed at underwriters.  Some 
commentators cite the problem that issuers “are at an informational or 
bargaining disadvantage relative to the underwriters who are privy to the 
market demand for the IPO shares,”93 which “often leads to the 
underpricing of initial public offerings.”94  Others contend that 
underpricing is symptomatic of a massive “pump-and-dump”95 scheme: 
This IPO price curve is the expected result of a 
concerted effort of the investment banks and other 
industry insiders to extract wealth from the investing 
public by acquiring stock, hyping that stock, and then 
selling that stock.96 
According to this account, underwriters and managers unduly engage in 
underpricing to increase the probability that pre-IPO allocations will be 
                                                          
91 See, e.g., James C. Spindler, Research Analyst Conflicts, the Market for 
Underwriting Business, and Credible Signaling (July 2004) (manuscript at 17) (“If 
issuers and underwriters may have positive information about themselves that they 
cannot disclose in the prospectus due to overbearing liability, they face an adverse-
selection, or ‘lemon,’ problem in marketing the issuer’s securities to investors . . . .”), 
available at http:///ssrn.com/abstract=564381; see also generally George A. Akerlof, The 
Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 
488 (1970).  This implicates the question of the extent to which stock price accurately 
reflects an issuer’s value.  See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman & Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).  Among the more serious 
challenges to the Efficient Markets Capital Hypothesis have come from legal decision 
theory, otherwise known as behavioral law and economics.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:  The 
Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003) (incorporating insights from legal decision 
theory into their MOME thesis).  But see, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 80 (2003) (“I suspect that the end result 
[of the behavioral theory influx] will not be an abandonment of the belief of many in the 
profession that the stock market is remarkably efficient in its utilization of information.”); 
supra note 86. 
92 See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on 
Flipping IPO Securities, 74 TUL. L. REV. 883 (2000).  Disclosure, however, seeks to 
ensure only that investors possess requisite quality information about an issuer, and not 
that they will utilize this information properly, much less value stock accurately.  See, 
e.g., HAZEN, supra note 57, § 1.2[3][A], at 22 (“[F]ull disclosure provides investors with 
sufficient opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment and fend for themselves.”). 
93 Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Should Issuers Be on the Hook for Laddering?  
An Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market Manipulative Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
179, 182 (2004). 
94 Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 433, 458 (2003).  But cf. infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
95 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 313, 334 n.65 (2002) (referencing “‘pump and dump’ schemes under which an 
investor first purchases a large quantity of a company’s securities, portrays the company 
as favorable, and then sells the securities as the price increases”). 
96 Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 717; see also Coffee, supra note 13, at 6 
(“Such an extravagant discount cannot be justified . . . particularly when the vast majority 
of shares in IPOs go to a concentrated group of mutual funds and money managers.”). 
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profitable.  That profit comes in the form of personal holdings as well as 
reciprocal future business from prominent investors,97 and arguably at 
the expense of the issuer.98 
Underpricing, however, is better regarded as a form of 
compensation, and not inefficiency.  The consequences of a “sticky,” or 
unsuccessful, issue can be devastating for underwriters.99  To be sure, 
they do receive a commission in exchange for assuming the actual and 
reputational risks of reselling shares to the public.100  But underpricing 
functions as insurance against such risks.101  A conservative offering 
price can increase the probability that stock will “pop” on the first day, 
                                                          
97 See, e.g., Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic 
Allocation, 56 J. FIN. 2337, 2338 (2001) (finding that “bidders who participate in a large 
number of issues receive favorable treatment”).  That study, however, fails to find 
evidence that such investors “earn profits beyond those earned by other investors.”  Id. at 
2339. 
98 See, e.g., Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 761-62 (contending that 
underpricing represents distorted decision-making by managers and underwriters about 
when to go public, on the basis that “in boom periods, more underwriters bring more 
issuers to market” while “[i]n cold periods, underwriters bring fewer issuers to the 
market”).  But see, e.g., Jean Helwege & Nellie Liang, Initial Public Offerings in Hot and 
Cold Markets, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 541, 544 (2004) (“Hot and cold 
market IPOs do not differ in the use of discretionary accruals or by analysts’ earning 
growth forecasts, nor do hot market IPOs have lower institutional ownership after the 
IPO.”); Daniel L. McConaughy et al., Agency Costs, Market Discipline and Market 
Timing:  Evidence from Post-IPO Operating Performance, 20 ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE 43, 43 (1996) (“Entrepreneurs who bring their firms into the 
public securities markets maintain the pre-IPO performance of their firms.  This suggests 
that agency costs do not increase significantly and that the poor post-IPO stock market 
performance is due more to over-optimistic investors extrapolating current growth into 
the future.”) (emphasis added).  An additional problem with this “pump-and-dump” 
account is that the internet bubble period did not experience any appreciable increase in 
the rate at which issuers went public.  See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text 
(Table 2, Internet Bubble IPO Returns, 1998-2001). 
99 See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 80 (“The purpose of the dealer’s 
participation in the underwriting is to ensure a rapid sale of the offering.  If a rapid sale 
were not to occur, the issue might become ‘sticky,’ depressing the sales price and 
reducing (or eliminating) the underwriters’ profit.”); Griffith, supra note 17, at 591 (“An 
issue that does not sell will increase the underwriter’s cost of capital, exacerbate 
opportunity costs, and harm the underwriter’s reputation.”). 
100 Underwriter fees typically range between 5-10% of an IPO’s aggregate value.  
See, e.g., Richard Mann et al., Starting From Scratch:  A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing 
a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 839 (2004).  For IPOs between $20 and $80 
million, underwriters almost invariably charge a seven percent commission, whose 
uniformity has been the subject of intense debate about possible collusion.  Compare, 
e.g., Hsaun Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven-Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105 
(2000), with Robert S. Hansen, Do Investment Banks Compete in IPOs?:  The Advent of 
the “7% Plus Contract,” 59 J. FIN. ECON. 313 (2001).  See also Royce de R. Barondes et 
al., IPO Spreads:  You Get What You Pay For (June 2000) (finding variations in 
commission rates that correlate to variable marketing efforts), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=233146. 
101 An additional risk stems from the fact that a firm-commitment IPO is typically 
priced four business days prior to the stock’s debut, a necessary lag that inheres a risk of 
decline.  See, e.g., Deanna L. Kirkpatrick, The Underwriting Agreement, in HOW TO 
PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 277, 288 (2004). 
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which may entice investors to purchase all available shares.102  Further, a 
pop rewards recipients of preferentially allocated shares, who are often 
repeat investors with considerable incidental business.103  And a pop 
arguably suggests a limited basis, if any, for damages,104 thus dissuading 
prospective plaintiffs from bringing claims under the Securities Act.105 
Moreover, underpricing is governed by powerful market norms.  The 
persistence of underpricing over time has created an entrenched 
expectation within investors to witness substantial first-day pops from 
quality IPOs: 
If, on average, an investment banker does not underprice 
its offerings enough, the average initial return will be too 
low, and uninformed investors will cease doing business 
with this underwriter.  On the other hand, if, on average, 
an investment banker underprices its offering too much, 
so that the average initial return is too high, potential 
issuers will cease using this underwriter.106 
An underwriter’s objective thus is to set an offering price optimally 
beneath, and not equal to, its projected closing price.107 
This objective is difficult to accomplish because of an underwriter’s 
competing constituencies.  On the one hand issuers prefer underwriters 
with an established track record of leaving only a limited amount of 
money on the table.108  On the other hand aftermarket investors tend to 
                                                          
102 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 17, at 605-06 n.71 (citing results from a 2002 poll 
in which “over 70% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
‘high first day returns are necessary to gain interest in the IPO.’”) (quoting Patricia A. 
Ryan & Irv DeGraw, A Brief Comparison of the Oct 2000-June 2002 IPO CFO Results to 
the 1996-1998 IPO tbl. 7 (working paper)). 
103 See, e.g., Francesca Cornelli et al., Pre-IPO Markets (2003) (manuscript at 2) 
(“In the literature, the exclusion of retail investors from bookbuilding has typically been 
justified by arguing that retail investors are uniformed and it is optimal to restrict the 
participation in bookbuilding to the (informed) institutional investors.”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=548683. 
104 See, e.g., Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 
43 J. FIN. 789, 797-800 (1988). 
105 See generally Philip D. Drake & Michael R. Vetsuypens, IPO Underpricing and 
Insurance Against Legal Liability, 22 FIN. MGMT. 1 (1993).  This is not necessarily an 
undesirable result considering the proliferation of “professional plaintiffs,” whose class 
action suits typically result in minimal compensation to shareholders.  The point here is 
only that underpricing arguably represents an attractive and rational way for issuers and 
underwriters to diminish their liability.  But see generally Alexander, supra note 6. 
106 Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 215 (1986). 
107 Investors also respond to the actual offering price.  See, e.g., Daily et al., supra 
note 3, at 280 (“[A] very modest offer price will signal little demand, little value, or 
both.”).  But cf. infra notes 123, 328, and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and 
the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285 (1998) (finding a strong inverse 
correlation between an underwriter’s reputation and underpricing); Dennis E. Logue, 
Premia on Unseasoned Equity Issues, 1965-69, 25 J. ECON. & BUS. 133, 135 (1973) 
(examining 83 issues and finding that those “underwritten by prestigious investment 
bankers was 20.8 percent, whereas the average performance of issues underwritten by 
non-prestigious investment bankers was 52.1 percent”). 
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view underpricing as a proxy of an underwriter’s quality,109 even though 
they tend to receive limited personal benefits from first-day pops.110  
Underwriters thus must negotiate between a delicate balancing act.111 
To be sure, there is anecdotal evidence of underwriters and managers 
engaging in “pump-and-dump” schemes.112  But this hardly proves a 
systemic defect in bookbuilding.  And the arguments presented by 
bookbuilding’s critics simply sidestep the method’s broader and more 
established justifications. 
 
B. Spinning Bubbles 
 
Another strand of attack against bookbuilding concerns spinning.  
This practice of preferentially allocating pre-market IPO shares to 
investors is routine.  Underwriters spin an estimated 79 percent of IPO 
shares to executives, institutional investors, politicians, as well as all of 
their family and friends.113  The bulk of spun shares end up in the hands 
of institutional investors, who receive anywhere from 70 to 85 percent of 
an offering’s total allocation.114 
                                                          
109 See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, The “Hot Issue” Market of 1980, 47 J. BUS. 215, 220 
(1984) (“[I]ndividuals face an adverse selection problem when submitting a purchase 
order.  If the issue is overpriced (v < OP), only uninformed investors will submit 
purchase orders.”).  But see, e.g., Daily et al., supra note 3, at 277 (“The vast majority of 
IPO shares are not initially sold on the open market; rather, they are sold to key clients of 
the underwriters . . . [who] want to reduce underpricing, as it represents money left on the 
table.”) 
110 See, e.g., Daily et al., supra note 3, at 275 (“Uninformed investors realize that, on 
average, they will earn below-average returns.”).  This can be explained, in part, by the 
fact that underwriters justifiably favor “bidders who reveal information through limit 
prices” and those “who participate in a large number of issues,” a finding that “is 
consistent with the argument that such investors are being compensated for the insurance 
they provide.”  Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 97, at 2338-39. 
111 See, e.g., Daily et al., supra note 3, at 277 (“Underwriters are dual agents with 
two key constituents in the IPO process.  The first constituent is the firm whose securities 
the underwriters represent.  The second is the client base to whom the underwriters 
market the IPO securities.”). 
112 See supra note 95, 98, and accompanying text. 
113 See, e.g., Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 2) (“In 
almost all IPOs conducted in the United States, the vast majority, almost 80 percent, of 
original IPO shares are pre-allocated by the underwriters of the offering.”) (citation 
omitted); Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace:  Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 
1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 441 (2000) (“Shareholders who are allowed 
to purchase ‘in’ an offering are those who are the first buyers of the securities issued. . . .  
This group is usually very limited, including only institutional investors, members of 
Congress, and those with connections to underwriters.”).  See also supra note 17. 
114 See, e.g., Letter from Jane C. Sherburne, Deputy General Counsel of Citigroup, 
Inc., to Michael G. Oxley, Chairman of the House Committee on Finance Services, and 
John J. LaFalce, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Financial Services, 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/citidocs_001.pdf (Aug. 26, 2002); Sale, 
supra note 113, at  441 (“[O]n average, small investors receive less than one quarter of 
the total shares in an IPO.  In the typical IPO, the percentage of offered shares allocated 
to institutional investors generally ranges from 70% to 85% of the total shares.”) (citation 
omitted).  To be clear, not all of the shares institutional investors receive are spun. 
V.1.91 DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE THIS DRAFT WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 3/2/2006 
20 THE PRICE OF AUCTION-BASED IPOS [March 
 
Spun shares are not merely a mark of privilege, but also a potential 
source of profit.115  Recipients of spun shares may either retain them for 
aftermarket returns or sell them at a premium to third parties, otherwise 
known as flipping.116  Spinning also serves as one among many widely-
sanctioned explanations for underpricing.117  Specifically, underwriters 
offer shares at a lower price to influential and prominent investors as 
compensation for their assumption of the additional risks associated with 
IPOs.118  In exchange underwriters receive a greater probability that the 
issue will be subscribed fully and diversity of ownership that guards 
against concentrated holdings by a few institutional investors.119 
Some, however, believe a link exists between spinning, and 
underpricing.  One prominent theory posits that: “Underpricing enables 
spinning by providing underwriters with a ready supply of hot IPO 
shares.  But underpricing is also an end of spinning when hot allocations 
are used to induce issuer-managers to underprice their own offerings.”120  
According to this “underwriter welfare maximization” calculus,121 
underwriters will discount the price of IPO shares based on the 
corresponding commission foregone versus the short- or long-term 
returns.122  When these returns, which can come in the form of insurance 
against a sticky issue or protection from Securities Act liability,123 are 
                                                          
115 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 17, at 587 (“[S]pinning allocations rarely, if ever, 
result in trading losses.”).  Griffith contends that “underwriters only spin shares of hot 
offerings–that is, those for which there is significant aftermarket demand.”  Id. at 587 
n.12.  An incidental benefit to receiving spun shares is acquiring the ability to meet the 
otherwise impossible tracing requirement imposed on antifraud claims under sections 11 
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.  See, e.g., Peter B. Oh, Tracing, 80 TUL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =713767. 
116 See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest--
Does Gatekeeping Work?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 859, 884 (2005) (“Some investors who 
purchase stock in an IPO quickly resell the stock, known as ‘flipping,’ to realize the 
short-term gains.”).  Underwriters have devised a variety of anti-flipping mechanisms.  
See, e.g., id. at 885-86. 
117 See supra Part I.A.  See also Townsend, supra note 21, at 1136 (“Spinning 
creates an added incentive for underwriters to underprice IPOs.”) (citation omitted). 
118 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 17, at 594, 597 (“Spinning improves the 
underwriter’s welfare by generating goodwill on the part of the recipient of the spun 
shares. . . . Underwriters may also seek to use spinning allocations to win the favor of 
politicians and government officials.”).  This includes allocation to managers of private 
firms, on the thought that “You pay them off and expect you’re going to get treated in 
kind when they do the transaction.”  Michael Siconolfi, The Spin Desk:  Underwriters Set 
Aside IPO Stock for Officials of Potential Customers, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 12, 1997, at A1 
(quoting Robert Messih, managing director of Salomon, Inc.) (quotation marks omitted). 
119 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. 
120 Griffith, supra note 17, at 589-90; see also Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 
12, at 890 (“From a regulatory point of view, the message seems clear:  extreme 
underpricing of new issues is likely to be associated with illicit activities such as 
laddering, false analyst coverage, spinning, and so on.”). 
121 Griffith, supra note 17, at 593. 
122 See id. at 599 (“Underpricing will be worthwhile to underwriters on the margin 
provided that the value of the insurance and goodwill generated through underpricing 
exceeds the commission losses . . . .”); supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.  Griffith contends that 
“underwriters probably only consider underpricing as insurance at [marginally] higher 
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sufficient, underwriters will have an incentive to underprice shares; and, 
akin to the “comp” system employed by casinos, these shares then can be 
flipped in exchange for reciprocal goodwill.124 
In this way underpricing is believed to a necessary predicate for 
spinning.  Unlike other pre-IPO allocation practices, spinning is 
conceived as a practice by which underwriters direct “allocations to 
particular individuals, usually those in positions of power and influence, 
rather leaving the syndicate’s brokers with the discretion to dole out 
individual allocations to just anyone.”  This practice is not about playing 
favorites, but generating profits.125  Underwriters allegedly spin IPO 
shares because they expect issuer-managers to agree to underpricing of 
shares.126  Receiving these shares induces the managers of the issuer 
currently going public to permit underpriced shares, which can increase 
the likelihood of a profitable flip.127  Receiving these shares also induces 
the managers of other issuers going public to retain these same spinning 
underwriters and permit underpriced shares.128  Both scenarios thus 
involve a “complex wealth transfer,”129 in which managers effectively 
employ underwriters to pocket money deliberately left on the issuer’s 
table.130  In this way spinning taps into the incentives for underpricing, 
which in turn guarantees a supply of shares that can be spun.131 
                                                                                                                                  
price levels where the increased risk of a sticky issue marginally outweighs the expected 
return from an incremental increase in offering price.”  Griffith, supra note 17, at 593.  
But cf. generally Roger G. Ibbotson et al., Initial Public Offerings, 1 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 37 
(1988). (noting that firms with offering prices below $3 experience high levels of 
underpricing). 
124 Griffith, supra note 17, at 594-99. 
125 See, e.g.,) (“The notion that there is-or might be-a difference between paying the 
greens fee of a CEO/manager who accompanies the investment banker on a golf outing, 
on the one hand, the underwriter’s practice of spinning, on the other hand, seems rather 
obvious.”). 
126 Griffith, supra note 17, at 623-24.  In receiving spun stock managerial 
shareholders arguably have breached their fiduciary duties.  See, e.g., William H. 
Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement, Statement Before 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/testimony/ts050703whd.htm (May 7, 2003) (noting that spinning “raises serious 
questions about whether the corporate insiders who take hot IPO shares in exchange for 
their firms’ investment banking business are breaching their fiduciary duties to their 
shareholders”).  See also generally Therese M. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty or Business As Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2037 n.33 
(2002). 
127 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
128 Griffith, supra note 17, at 623-24 (“By spinning underpriced shares of other 
issuers to their counterparts across the negotiating table, underwriters may hope to induce 
them to accept underpricing in their own offering.”). 
129 Id. at 624. 
130 For issuers, however, the rationality of underpricing is less clear.  As Griffith 
notes, “[i]ssuers lose $0.93 per dollar of underpricing.  Underpricing is thus much more 
expensive to issuers than it is to underwriters.  So why do they do it?”  Griffith, supra 
note 17, at 600 (calculating the issuers’ losses based on underwriters receiving their 
standard seven percent commission rate); see also supra note 100. 
131 Id. at 594 (“Underwriters assure themselves of a supply of shares for spinning by 
underpricing IPOs.”). 
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New and proposed regulations, however, sever part of this purported 
link.  NASD Rule 2790, “Restrictions on the Purchase and Sale of Initial 
Equity Public Offerings,” prohibits certain “restricted persons” from 
receiving IPO allocations.132  Among these “restricted persons” are 
broker-dealers, their affiliates and relatives, finders and fiduciaries, and 
portfolio managers.133  And proposed NASD Rule 2712, “IPO 
Allocations and Distributions,” prohibits broker-dealers and their 
associates from allocating shares from an IPO on a quid pro quo basis for 
past or future investment banking business, a bar that extends to directors 
or executives of a recent client of the underwriting syndicate.134  These 
rules eliminate most forms of spinning,135 and thus disrupt Griffith’s 
“complex wealth transfer” account.  This is because spinning no longer 
represents a quasi-legal means for underwriters and managers to divert 
offering proceeds to themselves.136  To be sure, some diversion still may 
occur, but its illegality severely dampens the extent to which 
underwriters and managers will underprice to spin. 
Moreover, the interconnection between spinning and underpricing 
has more conjectural appeal than empirical support.  To redress what is 
admittedly a “poverty of direct comparative data,”137 Sean Griffith has 
presented findings from three empirical studies.  The first study is from 
Griffith himself.  Using data from IPOs during 1999 to 2000 Griffith 
finds that eleven firms, with inside managers who allegedly spun shares, 
all experienced a larger degree of underpricing than the average for their 
counterparts.138  The second study is by Tim Loughran and Jay Ritter, 
who conclude: 
                                                          
132 NASD, MANUAL (CCH), R. 2790(a) (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter NASD, R. 2790].  
Rule 2790 expands the restrictions first established by the Free-Riding and Withholding 
Interpretation, which applied only to hot issues and thus earned the name of the Hot Issue 
Rule.  See NASD, MANUAL (CCH), IM-2110-1 (Apr. 2003). 
133 NASD, R. 2790(i)(10), supra note 132. 
134 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rules Changes by the New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the 
Prohibition of Certain Abuses in the Allocation and Distribution of Shares in Initial 
Public Offerings (“IPOs”), Sec. Rel. No. 34-50896, 69 Fed. Reg. 77804, 77805 (Dec. 20, 
2004) [hereinafter NASD, R. 2712].  But see Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra 
note 37 (manuscript at 5) (“Unfortunately, this proposed rule [2712] has been open for 
comment for three years, so the probability that it will be accepted is small.”).  Proposed 
Rule 2712 also prohibits a separate practice, known as flipping, or “the initial sale of IPO 
shares purchased in an offering within 30 days following the offer date of such offering,”  
and requires the lead underwriter to disclose the names of interested institutional 
investors.  NASD, R. 2712, supra note 132, at 77805-6. 
135 Neither rule prohibits directed-share plans or allocations to institutional investors, 
and yet, interestingly, both practices are excluded from Griffith’s conception of spinning.  
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  Directed share plans are not part of the 
conception of spinning used here, as such plans are conducted by the issuer and constitute 
a small percentage of allocations.  See id. 
136 Spinning is quasi-legal in that, as others have argued persuasively, the practice 
may be combated through pre-existing doctrinal frameworks.  See supra note 126 and 
accompanying text; infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
137 Griffith, supra note 17, at 627. 
138 See id. at 626.  Griffith notes certain obvious methodological caveats to this data 
set, specifically, that the number of IPOs with insiders is likely underinclusive and that 
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As IPO underpricing increased in the 1990s . . . the 
ability to use hot IPOs to reward decision-makers 
resulted in the decision-makers seeking out underwriters 
with reputations for leaving money on the table, rather 
than avoiding these underwriters.139 
These findings comport with the final study, by William Ljungqvist and 
William Wilhelm of IPOs from 1996 to 2000, that confirms 
“underpricing is significantly lower when insider ownership stakes are 
larger and less fragmented and when insiders sell more shares at the offer 
price.”140  From this Griffith infers that “[d]ecreased insider ownership 
suggests decreased manager incentives to monitor the pricing 
process.”141 
A closer examination of these studies, however, reveals inferential 
gaps.  If a link exists between spinning and underpricing, the 
astronomical degree of underpricing within Griffith’s IPO data set should 
be accompanied by a miniscule level of insider ownership.  And 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm in fact conclude that “insider percentage 
holdings declined over the sample period [1996-2000] . . . .”142  But 
while Loughran and Ritter agree with this conclusion, they also find that, 
from 1999 to 2000, “CEO dollar ownership (the market value of the 
CEO’s holdings) was substantially higher, resulting in increased 
incentives to avoid underpricing.”143 
The difference between these two findings is subtle, but significant.  
Unlike Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, who measure insider ownership as a 
percentage of total shares offered, Loughran and Ritter focus on the total 
monetary amount of what insiders own.144  The latter metric would seem 
to exert a far greater influence on insiders’ incentives to underprice; put 
differently, insiders who own a significant portion of the offering, but 
individually have small investments or expected spinning profits, may 
not be as motivated to risk deliberate underpricing.145  Ultimately, 
Loughran and Ritter find “little support” for the Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
                                                                                                                                  
the underpricing levels for these IPOs are also included within the average for all IPOs.  
As a result, he cautions against using “these data to compare the underpricing margins of 
firms engaging in underpricing to those that do not.”  Id. at 627.  At the same time, 
however, Griffith contends that “these weaknesses of the data set make the argument for 
a link between spinning and underpricing stronger, not weaker.”  Id. 
139 Id. at 629 n.155 (quoting Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 30); see also 
Griffith, supra note 17, at 585-86 (“By the end of the 1990s . . . [the] demand for IPO 
shares empowered the underwriter . . . to allocate shares to investors on a preferential 
basis.”). 
140 Alexander P. Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Pricing in the Dot-Com 
Bubble 2 (Feb. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=295662. 
141 Griffith, supra note 17, at 629. 
142 Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 140, at 2. 
143 Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
144 Id. at 21 
145 Id. at 19 (“It is not obvious . . . that CEO percentage ownership is as important as 
the market value of these shares if we want to measure the managerial benefits of a 
higher offer price.”). 
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hypothesis.146  In any event Griffith utilizes neither metric in his own 
data set, which simply establishes the margin of underpricing within 
firms that allegedly spun shares to insiders.147 
Further, all of these empirical studies have limited extrapolative 
value.  The purported link between underpricing and spinning rests on 
data from the two-year internet bubble period.148  From 1999 to 2000 




INTERNET BUBBLE IPO RETURNS, 1998-2001149 
 
YEAR OFFERINGS AVG. FIRST-DAY RETURN 
AVG. 3-YR. 
RETURN 
1998 317 20.1% 27.1% 
1999150 487 69.6% (45.2%) 
2000 385 55.4% (59.6%) 
2001 81 13.7% 8.9% 
 
During the two-year internet bubble the average first-day return of 63.3 
percent was over three times more than the next highest year (1995), 
over four times more than the average for the previous eight years (1990-
98), and over five times more than the average for the subsequent five 
years (2001-05).151  Internet bubble IPOs left an average of $85 million 
on the table,152 over double that of the next highest year (2001), and over 
nine times the average for the previous nine years (1990-1998).153 
A myriad of explanations for the internet bubble already exist,154 and 
there is no need to examine them here.  The point is that a significant 
portion of the IPOs conducted during this two-year period involved 
                                                          
146 Id. at 6. 
147 See Griffith, supra note 17, at 626-27. 
148 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
149 Data for Offerings and Average First-Day Return from Ritter, supra note 2, at 9.  
Data for Average Three-Year Return from id. at 13. 
150 But see, e.g., Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 715 (citing a study that found 
“the average stock [in 1999] was underpriced by 65 percent” and yet another study that 
found “the average first-day share price increase, or ‘pop’ in 1999 was . . . 77 percent”) 
(citing Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing 
10 (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-282293, Melanie Warner, Friends 
and Family:  Sycamore Gave Lots of “Directed Shares” to a Key Customer, FORTUNE, 
Mar. 20, 2000, at 102). 
151 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (Table 1, U.S. IPO Returns, 1980-
2005). 
152 Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 11. 
153 Ritter, Money Left by Year, supra note 80, at 1. 
154 For a comprehensive and dynamic bibliography of the internet bubble literature, 
see Jay Ritter & Ivo Welch, The Initial Public Offerings (IPO) Bibliography, 
http://www.iporesources.org/iporefs/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
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highly unusual dynamics.  High-tech firms participated in almost half of 
the internet bubble IPOs in the Loughran and Ritter study.155  On average 
these firms went public faster than their 1980s and early 1990s 
predecessors, as well as current firms.156  And prestigious underwriters 
exhibited an uncharacteristic willingness to support internet bubble 
offerings with their dramatically lower median sales;157 this is consistent 
with evidence that the quality of IPO entrants declined during the bubble 
period.158  The combined effect is that “prestigious underwriters relaxed 
their underwriting standards and took public an increasing number of 
very young and unprofitable companies” on a level that we had never 
seen before.159 
The internet bubble’s peculiar composition cautions against drawing 
broad conclusions and prescriptions about spinning and underpricing.  
The link between these two practices is formulated as a perpetual cycle 
in which underpricing making spinning to insiders possible, which in 
turn provides an incentive to permit underpricing.160  There is ample 
evidence that spinning depends upon underpricing.  But the cycle falls 
apart when one attempts to examine spinning in isolation.  As Loughran 
and Ritter ask:  “If spinning is an important reason for underpricing in 
the bubble period, why wasn’t it important a decade earlier?”161  
According to them, “underpricing fed on itself. . . . underpricing creates 
incentives for even more underpricing.  What constrains underpricing 
from increasing without limit is that raising money is still a goal for an 
issuer.”162  If this is correct, the combined effect of new regulatory 
prohibitions on spinning and incentives for managers to generate 
sufficient equity limit their ability to explain underpricing.  At the very 
least, the data presented thus far does not yield a clear answer about the 
relationship between underpricing and spinning.  And the multiplicity of 
variables within the internet bubble period demands additional proof 
from other periods before reaching any conclusions about whether 
spinning and underpricing are truly linked. 
                                                          
155 See, e.g., Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 17; see also id. at 35 (using 
Standard Industrial Classifications to define “tech” versus “internet” firms).  Within the 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm study internet firms accounted for 55 percent of the IPOs in 
1999, and 36 percent of the IPOs in 2000.  Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 140, at 5. 
156 The median age of firms going public decreased from 7.5 years to 5 years during 
the internet bubble and then increased to 12 years.  Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 
18-20. 
157 Id. at 22-23. 
158 See, e.g., Beverly B. Marshall et al., Early Internet IPOs Versus Subsequent 
Entrants, 28 J. ECON. & FIN. 104 (2004). 
159 Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 22. 
160 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
161 Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 12.  Indeed, average underpricing levels 
during the 1990s were exactly the same as those in the 1960s.  See, e.g., Ljungqvist, 
supra note 4, at 1 (“Underpricing has tended to fluctuate a great deal, averaging 21% in 
the 1960s, 12% in the 1970s, 16% in the 1980s, 21% in the 1990s, and 40% in the four 
years since 2000 (reflecting mostly the tail-end of the late 1990s internet boom).”). 
162 Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, at 12. 
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Like bookbuilding, auctions are best understood as a device for 
resolving asymmetric information problems.163  Auctions collect bidders’ 
valuations while sidestepping collective bargaining problems by 
presuming the seller has all of the negotiating power.164  This power 
comes in the form of the seller’s unilateral ability to select an auction 
type and a set of policies in advance. 
A voluminous amount of economic and financial literature has 
examined auction design and policies.  This literature has identified 
certain similarities between all auction types as well as differences 
between the common English, or ascending-bid, and Dutch, or 
descending-bid, auction.  There is also literature examining the problem 
of bidding rings and other manipulative means to thwart auctions.  This 
Part summarizes this literature, which is a necessary foundation to 
analyzing auction-based mechanisms for going public. 
 
A. Asymmetrical Pairs 
 
Auction theory exhibits a decidedly cosmopolitan flavor.  In the 
English, or ascending-bid, auction the price rises successively until only 
one bidder remains;165 there is also a Japanese variant of this auction in 
which the price rises successively as bidders publicly quit and cannot re-
enter the process.166  Conversely, in the Dutch, or descending-bid, 
auction the price drops successively until only one bidder remains;167 and 
there is a French variant of this auction, or Mise en Vente, in which the 
                                                          
163 See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding Rings, 82 AM. ECON. 
REV. 579, 581 (1992) (“The distinctive feature of an auction is asymmetric information; 
if the seller knew the bidders’ demands, he would simply post a price.”). 
164 See generally Jeremy I. Bulow & D. John Roberts, The Simple Economics of 
Optimal Auctions, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1060 (1989) (demonstrating that optimal auction 
design is tantamount to third-degree price discrimination). 
165 Ascending-bid auctions are typically used in the sale of antiques and art.  R. 
Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699, 702 
(1987).  One of the most famous English auctions was conducted by the Praetorian 
Guard.  After the assassination of Emperor Pertinax, the Guard sold off the entire Roman 
Empire in 193 A.D.; the winner, Didius Julianus, assumed the role of Caesar for a mere 
two months before being overthrown and executed.  See Martin Shubik, Auctions, 
Bidding, and Markets:  An Historical Sketch, in AUCTIONS, BIDDING, AND CONTRACTING 
33, 42-3 (Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. eds., 1983).  See also Paul Klemperer, 
Auction Theory:  A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURVEYS 227, 267 n.21 (1999) 
(dryly observing this was “an early and sad case of the winner’s curse”). 
166 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 165, at 229 (noting this is “the model most 
commonly used by auction theorists”). 
167 Descending-bid auctions are used in Canada to sell tobacco, in Holland to sell 
flowers, and in Israel to sell fish.  See id. at 266 n.13.  The descending-bid auction is 
sometimes called an open first-price auction, as both types of auctions are strategically 
equivalent.  See id. at 230.  See also infra note 77. 
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price is a function of aggregate demand and the auctioneer allocates 
shares pro rata according to limit orders submitted by bidders.168 
Two other prominent varieties of auctions involve the use of sealed-
bids.169  The first-price sealed-bid auction designates the highest 
privately submitted bid as the winner.170  As William Vickrey has 
demonstrated, however, the highest bidder in such auctions suffers from 
what is known as the “winner’s curse,” a feeling of regret for having paid 
more than anyone else.171  To produce a more optimal expected return, 
the second-price sealed-bid, or Vickrey, auction designates the second 
highest privately submitted bid as the winner.172 
All auction types have two paradigmatic models based on incomplete 
information.173  Within the pure private-value model bidders have and 
know only their individual, variable valuation of the auctioned item.174  
In contrast, within the pure common-value model, bidders have variable 
knowledge about the auctioned item, but its actual value is constant and 
unknown.175  Most actual auctions exhibit elements of both models,176 in 
that each bidder’s value is a general function of everyone else’s private 
information signals.177  To the extent auctions adhere to the common-
value model, bidders have an incentive to combat information 
                                                          
168 See, e.g., Bruno Biais & Anne Marie Faugeron-Crouzet, IPO Auctions:  English, 
Dutch, . . . French, and Internet, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 2 (2001).  See also infra 
notes 282-295 and accompanying text. 
169 Sealed-bids are an alternative to open auctions.  See generally Robert G. Hanse, 
Sealed-Bid Versus Open Auctions:  The Evidence, 24 ECON. INQ. 125 (1986) 
170 First-price sealed-bid auctions are used to sell mineral rights and miscellaneous 
goods through websites such as eBay.  See, e.g., Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A 
Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1093-94 (1982). 
171 See generally William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive 
Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 21-22 (1961).  But see generally James C. Cox & R. Mark 
Isaac, In Search of the Winner’s Curse, 22 ECON. INQ. 579 (1984) (delineating 
permutations of the winner’s curse phenomenon and contending that it generally occurs 
when bidders are not utilizing ex ante optimal strategies). 
172 Second-price sealed-bid auctions are used to sell stamps by mail and treasury 
securities.  See, e.g., Shubik, supra note 165, at 50.  As Klemperer notes, “[c]onfusingly, 
the second-price sealed-bid auction is sometimes called a Dutch auction by investment 
bankers.”  Klemperer, supra note 165, 266 at n.10.  To further complicate matters, the 
English auction is sometimes called an open second-price auction since they are 
strategically equivalent.  Id. at 230; see also infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text. 
173 See, e.g., Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Auctions and Bidding Models:  A 
Survey, 26 MGMT. SCI. 119, 119 (1980) (“Auctions with complete information may be 
formally defined but are relatively uninteresting as games and a poor representation of 
actual auctions.”). 
174 Klemperer, supra note 165, at 229 (“In the basic private-value model each bidder 
knows how much she values the object(s) for sale, but her value is private information to 
herself.”) (emphasis in original).  This is alternatively known as the “independent-
private-values” model.  See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 705. 
175 Klemperer, supra note 165, at 229-30 (“In the pure common-value model, by 
contrast, the actual value is the same for everyone, but bidders have different private 
information about what that value actually is.”) (emphasis in original). 
176 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 705 (“Real-world auction 
situations are likely to contain aspects of both [models] simultaneously.”). 
177 Klemperer, supra note 165, at 230. 
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asymmetries to gain superior knowledge about an auctioned item’s actual 
value.178 
Navigating through all these auction types and models is simplified 
by the Revenue Equivalent Theorem (RET).  Auction theory’s “most 
celebrated theorem”179 classically provides: 
Assume each of a given number of risk-neutral potential 
buyers has a privately-known signal [or valuation] 
independently drawn from a strict-increasing atomless 
distribution.  Then any mechanism in which (i) the 
object always goes to the buyer with the highest signal 
[or valuation], and (ii) any bidder with the lowest-
feasible signal [or valuation] expects zero surplus, yields 
the same expected revenue (and results in each bidder 
making the same expected payment as a function of her 
signal [or valuation]).180 
The RET involves four assumptions: (1) risk-neutral bidders181 (2) with 
independent values182 (3) who are otherwise symmetric and (4) whose 
payment is solely a function of the bids.183  Each bidder knows the rules 
of the auction, the number of total bidders, their risk profiles, valuations, 
and their knowledge of everyone else’s knowledge.184  And each bidder 
wants only one of any number of identical, indivisible auction items.185 
The RET yields a remarkable set of insights.  For the bidder the 
expected revenue equals the winner’s expected marginal revenue, a 
                                                          
178 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 705.  To the extent the auction adheres 
to a private-value model, combating asymmetrical information is irrelevant as bidders are 
concerned only with their own valuation of the auctioned item.  Such bidders, however, 
may have an incentive to engage in strategic behavior.  See infra Part III.B. 
179 Paul Klemperer, Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory, 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/WhyEveryEconomist.pdf 4 (Aug. 2001); see 
also Klemperer, supra note 165, at 232 (“This Revenue Equivalence Theorem result is so 
fundamental, so much of auction theory can be understood in terms of it . . . .”) (emphasis 
in original). 
180 Klemperer, supra note 165, at 230.  For the seminal derivations of the RET, see 
William Vickrey, Auction and Bidding Games, in RECENT ADVANCES IN GAME THEORY 
15 (1962); Vickrey, supra note 171.  The amount of literature on the RET is voluminous, 
particularly on the effects of relaxing each assumption.  For a comprehensive 
bibliography of this literature see Klemperer, supra note 165, at 278-86. 
181 Cf. infra note 184. 
182 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 165, at 232 (“Note that the result applies both to 
private-value models (in which a bidder’s value depends only on her own signal), and to 
more general common-value models provided bidders’ signals are independent.”).  See 
also generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Quang Vuong, Structural Analysis of Auction 
Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1996) (concluding that private and common value models 
are observationally equivalent when there is a fixed number of bidders and there is not a 
reserve price). 
183 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 706. 
184 See, e.g., id.  A number of commentators have demonstrated how the number of 
total bidders largely depends on bidders’ risk profiles and the independence of their 
values.  See, e.g., Steven A. Matthews, Comparing Auctions for Risk-Averse Buyers:  A 
Buyer’s Point of View, 55 ECONOMETRICA 633 (1987). 
185 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 706. 
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criterion instrumental to choosing an optimal auction type.186  For the 
seller the English, Dutch, and both types of sealed-bid auctions all yield 
the same average expected revenue.187  And, by extension, all of these 
auction types are equally optimal selling mechanisms, provided they are 
supplemented by an optimal reserve price.188 
Different equilibria, however, reveal pairings among auction types.  
Both second-price sealed-bid and English auctions are stable Pareto 
optimal equilibria; the dominant strategy for bidders is to remain until 
the price matches their own true valuation.189  In contrast both first-price 
sealed-bid and Dutch auctions satisfy only Nash equilibria;190 the rational 
strategy is for bidders to submit a price that is less than their own true 
valuation based upon guesses about other bidders’ valuations.191  This 
general equivalence between the second-price sealed-bid and English 
auctions as well as between the first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions 
often result in collapsing the four standard auction types into two pairs.192 
                                                          
186 See, e.g., id.  Accordingly, “an auctioneer should not sell below a reserve price 
set equal to the value of the bidder whose marginal revenue equals the value to the 
auctioneer of retaining the unit.”  Klemperer, supra note 165, at 233; see also infra notes 
193-200 and accompanying text. 
187 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 707, 710 (“Each of these auction forms 
yields on average the same revenue to the seller. . . . [But] [t]he Revenue-Equivalence 
Theorem does not imply that the outcomes of the four auction forms are always exactly 
the same.”).  This is also true for some non-standard auctions, such the “all-pay” auction 
in which every participant pays their bid with only the highest bid winning the object.  
Klemperer, supra note 165, at 232.  
As Vickrey has demonstrated, the first-price sealed auction yields the exact same 
revenue as the Dutch auction, independent of the bidder’s risk profile or valuation model.  
See generally Vickrey, supra note 171.  But see, e.g., David Lucking-Reiley, Using Field 
Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats:  Magic on the Internet, 89 
AM. ECON. REV. 1063 (1999) (demonstrating that Dutch auctions of collectible trading 
cards produces substantially higher revenues than first-price auctions, while the English 
and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues). 
188 See, e.g., John G. Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 381, 382 (1981) (“[F]or a broad family of auction rules, expected seller 
revenue is maximized using either of the two common auctions if the seller announces 
that he will not accept bids below some appropriately chosen minimum or ‘reserve’ 
price.”).  See also infra note 213. 
189 Klemperer, supra note 165, at 230 (“A little reflection shows that in a second-
price sealed-bid auction it is optimal for a player to bid her true value, whatever other 
players do.”). 
190 See supra note 48.  Moreover, both auction types yield the same average 
outcomes; this is independent of whether the assumptions about risk-neutrality and 
independent valuation obtain.  See, e.g., Vickrey, supra note 171, at 17 (“It can also be 
shown . . . that the two methods of auctioning produce . . . the same expected average 
expected price and hence the same average expected gains to the buyers and sellers, 
respectively.”). 
191 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 708; see also id. at 710 (noting 
that this is a “nontrivial computational problem”). 
192 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 165, at 231 (referring to ascending and second-
price sealed-bid auctions simply as “second-price,” and descending and first-price sealed-
bid auctions simply as “first-price”).  This paper instead refers to descending and first-
price sealed-bid auctions as Dutch auctions, since this is the conventional terminology 
prevalent within the IPO context.  See infra Part III.A. 
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Relaxing each of the RET’s assumptions reveals distinct 
circumstances in which a particular auction type may be optimal.  When 
bidders are risk-averse,193 with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions,194 second-price sealed-bid and English auctions produce the 
exact same expected revenue, but it tends to be inferior to what first-
price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions produce.195  When values are 
affiliated,196 English auctions yield the highest expected revenue, 
followed by second-price sealed-bid auctions, and then first-price sealed-
bid auctions, which yield the same expected revenue as Dutch 
auctions.197  When bidders are asymmetrical, there is no optimal auction 
type because of price discrimination,198 although 
roughly speaking, the sealed-bid auction generates more 
revenue than the [English] auction when bidders have 
distributions with the same shape (but different supports) 
. . . whereas the [English] auction dominates when, 
across bidders, distributions have different shapes but 
approximately the same support.199 
And when payment is a function not only of bids, but also any additional 
available information, the optimal auction type varies based on the 
incentive contract or royalty system involved.200 
                                                          
193 When the auctioneers are risk-averse, they will prefer the first-price sealed-bid 
and Dutch auctions over the second-price sealed bid auction, which they will prefer over 
the English auction.  See generally Keith Waehrer et al., Auction Form Preferences of 
Risk-Averse Bidtakers, 29 RAND J. ECON. 179 (1998). 
194 See, e.g., MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 70 (1996) (defining a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function as one that 
“assigns a utility value that [a person] places on every level of value or wealth that she 
can achieve with certainty”). 
195 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 719.  This is not to say that first-price 
sealed-bid and Dutch auctions will generate an optimal result, just that they will be 
preferred by risk-averse bidders who will be more aggressive.  With risk-averse bidders 
the seller optimally should provide insurance for the highest possible bid, while 
penalizing low bidders and subsidizing high bidders.  See, e.g., Eric S. Maskin & John G. 
Riley, Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1473, 1474 (1984). 
196 Affiliation means that an increase in one bid’s value improves the likelihood of 
an increase in another bid’s value; this is not simply a correlative relationship.  See, e.g., 
Klemperer, supra note 165, at 256-57 (Appendix D). 
197 See, e.g., Milgrom & Weber, supra note 170, at 1091-93. 
198 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 714-15 (“When bidders are 
asymmetric, the first-price sealed-bid auction yields a different price from the English 
auction:  Revenue equivalence breaks down. . . . This is analogous to second-degree price 
discrimination in the elementary-textbook monopoly model in that it involves 
discriminating across bidders with different demands.”).  This ambiguous result, 
however, obtains when there is a reserve price; in the absence of a reserve English 
auctions always yield an efficient outcome whereas sealed-bid auctions do not.  See 
generally Ronald Johnson, Oral Auction Versus Sealed Bids:  An Empirical 
Investigation, 19 NAT. RES. J. 315 (1979). 
199 See generally Eric S. Maskin & John G. Riley, Asymmetric Auctions, 67 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 413 (2000) (demonstrating that bidders with higher marginal revenue prefer 
the second-price auction whereas bidders with lower marginal revenue prefer the first-
price auction). 
200 See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding for Contracts:  A 
Principal-Agent Analysis, 17 RAND J. ECON. 326, 326 (1986) (examining government 
V.1.91 DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE THIS DRAFT WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 3/2/2006 
2006] THE PRICE OF AUCTION-BASED IPOS 31 
 
B. Bidding Rings201 
 
The practice of optimal auction design entails a set of basic 
considerations.  As Paul Klemperer has observed, 
[w]hat really matters in auction design are the same 
issues that any industry would recognize as key 
concerns:  discouraging collusive, entry-deterring and 
predatory behavior.  In short, good auction design is 
mostly good elementary economics.202 
Although designed to thwart auctions, bidding rings equally adhere to 
good elementary economics.  In essence ring members agree not to 
compete with each other whenever they can profit by assuming joint 
control over the auction price.203 
While capable of assuming a variety of forms,204 all bidding rings 
must satisfy at least four conditions to be successful.  First, the ring 
members must agree on how to allocate profits, otherwise known as 
                                                                                                                                  
incentive contracts, which “make[ ] the payment depend both on the bid and on realized 
costs”).  When an auction involves common-values, sellers have an incentive to publicize 
an item’s true value.  Sellers can do this by setting a reserve price, which should be 
higher as the number of bidders increases.  These indicia of value tends to increase 
bidders’ estimated valuations, and in turn leads to more aggressive bidding.  See, e.g., 
Milgrom & Weber, supra note 170, at 1095.  At the same time, bidders have an incentive 
to keep information private since publicizing it makes the expected surplus zero.  “This is 
a striking result; it implies that it is more important to a bidder that his information be 
private than that it be precise.”  McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 722. 
201 McAfee and McMillan note in their seminal article that 
[b]idding conspiracies are prevalent enough to have added some 
exotic locutions to the English language.  Cartels are variously called 
“rings,” “pies,” and “kippers.”  A “schlepper” is an insincere bidder 
attracted solely by the cartel’s profits, and a “shill” is a phony bidder 
used by the auctioneer to drive up the price.  A “knockout” is a 
private auction held by the cartel to determine which member gets the 
item and how much he pays the other members. 
McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 579, 579 n.1. 
202 Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 
169-70 (2002); see also generally Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, Identification of 
Standard Auction Models, 70 ECONOMETRICA 2107 (2002) (introducing additional 
economic variables for choosing between different auction types).  This was not always 
so.  For an extended period of time auctions were not regarded as an allocative 
mechanism because they had “committed the cardinal sin in economics of not being 
theoretically convenient to study in terms of the traditional neoclassical theory.”  Andrew 
Schotter, Auctions and Economic Theory, in BIDDING AND AUCTIONING FOR 
PROCUREMENT AND ALLOCATION 3, 4 (Yakov Amihud ed. 1976). 
203 See, e.g., RALPH CASSADY, JR., AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 177 (1967) 
(“When all the buyers who are interested in the same merchandise are included in the 
[bidding] ring, buyer competition gives way to monopsony, or buyer monopoly.”).  Cf. 
supra note 198. 
204 See, e.g., Daniel A. Graham & Robert C. Marshall, Collusive Bidder Behavior at 
Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions, 95 J. POLIT. ECON. 1217, 1220 (1987) 
(“The character of a bidder coalition depends on the type of object being sold.”) (citing 
CASSADY, supra note 203, 177-92 (delineating different types of bidding rings in the 
antique, fish, and wool industries)). 
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division-of-spoils.205  Second, that agreement must be self-enforcing, 
otherwise known as cartel enforcement.206  Third, there must be barriers 
to new bidders, otherwise known as entry deterrence.207  And, fourth, a 
bidding ring must be sufficiently stable to withstand attacks from 
victims, otherwise known as active seller responses.208 
Notably, none of these conditions requires that all buyers participate 
in the bidding ring.  Intuitively the ideal bidding ring might include all 
buyers, who in turn can select a representative to act as a monopsonist 
with the seller.209  But a bidding ring can operate in a dual market, split 
between ring and non-ring buyers.210  Indeed, such a dual market may be 
preferable: 
An obvious absence of competition would almost 
certainly alert the seller or his agent and lead to 
                                                          
205 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 583-88.  As McAfee and 
McMillan have observed, division-of-spoils is essentially an adverse selection problem, 
as colluding bidders “do not know how much of their fellow cartel members is willing to 
pay for the item being sold.”  Id. at 579. 
206 See, e.g., Dilip Abreu et al., Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect 
Monitoring, 31 J. ECON. THEORY 351 (1986). 
207 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 202, at 172 (“[A]n auction with too few bidders 
risks being unprofitable for the auctioneer and potentially inefficient.  Ascending auctions 
are often particularly poor in this respect, since they can allow some bidders to deter the 
entry, or depress the bidding, of rivals.”). 
208 See, e.g., Marc S. Robinson, Collusion and the Choice of Auction, 16 RAND J. 
ECON. 141, 143 (1985) (“For the prospective cartel to be stable, the recommended cartel 
strategies should be incentive-compatible, at least in the weak sense that some other 
strategy for an individual bidder not be strictly preferred by that bidder, given what the 
others are doing.”) (emphasis in original).  Incentive-compatibility is a function of 
sharing information, which studies demonstrate is crucial for a bidding ring’s stability, 
regardless of the type of auction involved.  See, e.g., id. at 141 & n.1 (“[A]s long as all 
cartel members share the same information, cartels are stable (i.e., incentive-compatible) . 
. . .  What is crucial for the results is . . . whether the cartel members regret their strategies 
if cheating occurs.”).  But see, e.g., Graham & Marshall, supra note 204, at 1218 n.3 
(“[T]he ‘incentive-compatibility’ problem and the determination of membership are 
important problems for the cartel.  Robinson also ignores the strategic response of the 
auctioneer and the information distinction between the English and second-price auctions 
when a cartel is present.”).  Sealed-bid auctions, however, do tend to be less susceptible 
than their oral counterparts to bidding rings.  See, e.g., Walter J. Mead, Natural Resource 
Disposal Policy-Oral Auction vs. Sealed Bids, 7 NAT’L RES. J. 194, 223 (1967) 
(concluding that “[o]ral bidding is vulnerable to collusive practices among bidders as 
well as to certain devices of unfair competition and emotionalism” to a greater degree 
than sealed bidding). 
209 See, e.g., CASSADY, supra note 203, at 178 (“An attempt is made to identify and 
make arrangements with all buyers who are expected to be interested in a particular item 
or a lot of goods.  Once this task is accomplished, one buyer, acting for all, is in a 
position to exert complete monopsonistic power and thus depress prices drastically . . . 
.”); Graham & Marshall, supra note 204, at 1220 (“The ring appoints a sole bidder who 
bids on behalf of the coalition at the auction.”). 
210 See, e.g., CASSADY, supra note 203, at 178 (“There would be a dual market 
situation:  one market would include all the interested buyers, uniformed as well as 
informed, and the other would include only those who are informed.    It is the informed 
segment that the ring leader attempts to control . . . .”); Graham & Marshall, supra note 
204, at 1221 (“In fact, if two or more distinct [collusive] coalitions appear at the same 
auction, they will invariably merge to form a single coalition.”). 
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defensive action against the ring . . . .  In fact, the 
appearance of competition is so important that the head 
of the [bidding ring] may find it necessary, in the 
absence of actual competition, to provide simulated 
competitive activity by assigning bidding roles to certain 
ring members, who stop either at a pre-arranged cutoff 
point or at a signal from the leader.211 
This simulated competition, or phantom bid, strategy is possible because 
ring buyers do not participate in an auction as individuals, but as a 
group.212  Any proceeds from the auction belong to the bidding ring, and 
are shared among its members instead of the individual member with the 
winning bid.213  A bidding ring thus seeks to maximize its joint expected 
profits. 
Such profits typically are determined and then distributed through 
separate auctions.  Prior to the at-large auction, the bidding ring 
ascertains each member’s valuation through bids.214  The winner is the 
member with the highest valuation,215 who likely would submit that same 
bid in the at-large auction.216  Should the bidding ring prevail, it will 
conduct another auction, or a “knockout.”217  Every member of the 
bidding ring then receives a portion of the difference between the 
winning bids in the at-large and knockout auctions;218 optimally, this 
                                                          
211 CASSADY, supra note 203, at 179. 
212 See, e.g., Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, Collusion in Auctions, 15/16 
ANNALES D’ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 217, 221 (1989) (“[Phantom] bids may be 
submitted to create the appearance of competition. . . . [G]iven the available data, it 
would be very difficult to detect the presence of an inclusive cartel that submitted 
phantom bids.”). 
213 See, e.g., Graham & Marshall, supra note 204, at 1220 (“The benefits of ring 
formation are shared among members rather than, for example, accruing entirely to the 
ring member who ultimately obtains possession of the item.”). 
214 Pursuant to the revelation principle, this valuation need not be accurate for the 
bidding ring to work successfully.  See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 580 
(“The revelation principle states that the outcome of any mechanism [for assigning bids 
and post-auction transfers] that is not incentive-compatible can be mimicked by one that 
is incentive-compatible, so that honesty can be assumed without loss of generality.”). 
215 In a descending-bid auction the highest valuation would be the lowest submitted 
bid from the bidding ring. 
216 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 586 (“An optimal cartel 
mechanism has the property that the bidder with the highest value if and only if his value 
exceeds r and the seller receives r.”). 
217 Not all bidding rings, however, are capable of making post-auction transfer 
payments.  As McAfee and McMillan have demonstrated, “weak” bidding rings operate 
by submitting identical bids that effectively convert the auction process into a random 
contest among the colluders.  See id. at 584 (“Why do the bidding firms choose such an 
apparently naïve form of coordination?  The answer . . . is that, given the asymmetry of 
information . . . identical bidding is the best the cartel can do short of using side-
payments.”). 
218 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 587-88.  But see, e.g., 
Robinson, supra note 208, at 144 (contending that even payment of ex post profits would 
fail to establish a Nash equilibrium in a sealed-bid auction among otherwise compliant 
ring members). 
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difference should be divided equally among all ring members, including 
the at-large winning bidder.219 
Though there is no honor among thieves, bidding rings tend to be 
rather effective at self-enforcement.  When there is only one auction, the 
bidding ring clearly will not have resort to threat of future retaliation, but 
instead may have to implement what McAfee and McMillan term “an 
organized-crime approach” to punishment.220  When there are repeated 
auctions or interaction among the bidding ring members, the threat of 
future retaliation is usually sufficient to secure cooperation.221  And case 
studies of retaliation in various industries ironically demonstrate that “it 
works very much to the seller’s advantage as vindicative competition 
leads to crazy prices.”222 
For better or for worse, legal regulation of auctions tends to be both 
ineffective and scarce.  One of the few such examples is England’s 
Auctions (Bidding Agreements) Act of 1927, which prohibits any 
agreements to abstain from auctions: 
If any dealer agrees to give, or gives, or offers any gift or 
consideration to any other person as an inducement or 
reward for abstaining, or for having abstained, from 
bidding at a sale by auction either generally or for any 
particular lot, or if any person agrees to accept, or 
accepts, or attempts to obtain from any dealer any such 
gift or consideration as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of an 
offense under this Act.223 
This statute, however, “is seldom invoked, and has had almost no effect 
on ring operations in England.”224  Perhaps the closest American 
analogue to the Bidding Agreements Act is the Sherman Act,225 but its 
prohibitions are tailored to cartel arrangements that are analytically 
distinct from auction-related collusion.226  Further, antitrust actions are 
                                                          
219 See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 588 n.13 (“[T]he knockout 
with equal profits is the optimal mechanism for the cartel:  there is no other mechanism, 
no matter how complicated, that does better.”).  This is restricted to sealed-bid knockouts, 
as “the oral knockout is not incentive-compatible.”  Id. at 588 (citations omitted). 
220 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 163, at 581. 
221 See, e.g., id. at 581 (“A deviating bidder can be threatened with noncooperative 
profit levels in all future auctions should he win the current auction when the mechanism 
dictated otherwise.  This threat will be sufficient to deter deviations if discounting is 
sufficiently low.”). 
222 JEREMY C. COOPER, UNDER THE HAMMER:  THE AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERS OF 
LONDON 37-8 (1977). 
223 2(3) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 246, at 120 (Lord MacKay, 4th ed. 2003).  
The penalty for such an offense is either a fine capped at the prescribed sum, six month 
imprisonment, or both.  Id. at 120 n.7. 
224 CASSADY, supra note 203, at 191; see also id. (concluding in passing that 
“recourse to law is at best a doubtful way of stamping out ring activities”). 
225 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).  The U.C.C. does generally provide for sales by an auction, 
but not for bidding rings or manipulative schemes.  See U.C.C. § 2-328 (2004). 
226 See, e.g., Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and 
Antitrust Law:  Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features 
of Auction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 83 (2004) (“[T]here are significant difference 
regarding the economics of collusion in auction and procurement markets as compared to 
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notoriously costly and difficult to conduct, much less win.227  The law 
thus affords sellers extremely limited formal means for detecting and 
combating bidding rings. 
Sellers, however, are hardly helpless, passive victims of bidding 
rings.  They have recourse to private countermeasures that involve lower 
transaction costs than formal legal means.228  In the short run a seller 
simply can retract its item or select a bid from a friendly party.229  
Similarly, in the long run, a seller can protect itself by submitting its own 
phantom bids or using an arbitrary or unpredictable method to selecting 
winning bidders.230  A seller also can set a reserve price, thereby 
diminishing the bidding ring’s profit margin;231 that reserve price then 
can be adjusted upwards or downwards to influence the expected 
purchase price.  And a seller could withhold certain bidding information, 
such as the winning valuation, in an attempt to disrupt the bidding ring’s 
ability to divide spoils or detect cheating internally.232 
 
III. AUCTION-BASED IPOS 
 
Securities offerings and auctions share a compatible relationship to 
asymmetrical information.  On the one hand IPOs suffer from 
information gaps between investors and issuers.233  On the other hand 
auctions represent a well-established way to bridge such gaps.234  Over 
the past three decades the connection between these two processes 
steadily has gained broader currency within the United States and around 
the world.235 
                                                                                                                                  
posted- price markets . . . .”).  Marshall and Meurer proceed to examine bidding rings, but 
their analysis largely folds into the economics literature previously analyzed in Part II.B. 
227 See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the 
Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 639 (2005) (referencing 
the “daunting evidentiary challenges in antitrust litigation” and general skepticism that 
even the “‘big case’ is worth its institutional costs”) (citations omitted). 
228 This may be the primary reason why legal regulation of auctions is so scarce. 
229 See, e.g., CASSADY, supra note 203, at 191 (“Upon recognizing the existence of a 
ring, the auctioneer not only can disregard the bids of the ring leader, but can actually 
make a sale to a friendly buyer. . . . Perhaps the most effective defensive tactic is to run 
up the price of an article by the use of phantom bids, or bids from nonexistent traders.”). 
230 See, e.g., Hendricks & Porter, supra note 212, at 221 (“The oligopoly literature 
suggests that increasing this sort of uncertainty can be fatal to a collusive agreement.”).  
In the case of identical bids the seller could select the winning bid on a mercurial 
arbitrary basis. 
231 See, e.g., CASSADY, supra note 203, at 191 (“In some auctions, the most effective 
way of overcoming a buyer’s ring is to set a reserve price, prohibiting sale of the item 
below its estimated value and thus impairing the profitability of a collusive operation.”). 
232 See, e.g., Hendricks & Porter, supra note 212, at 223 (“Clearly, restricting 
information flows within the cartel may hinder its ability to detect cheating.”). 
233 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
234 There are documented instances of auctions dating back to 500 B.C. in 
Babylonia.  See CASSADY, supra note 203, at 26-40 (providing a comprehensive 
historical account of auctions). 
235 Twenty years ago a student note specifically proposed the idea of U.S. companies 
conducting Dutch IPOs to eliminate underpricing.  See Katina J. Dorton, Note, 
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There are three prominent examples of auction-based IPOs.  The first 
is Google’s 2004 IPO, which is noteworthy primarily for its high 
visibility and historical significance as the largest auction-based IPO to 
date.  The second is the Mise en Vente, a variant of the Dutch IPO that 
hundreds of French issuers have used since 1983.236  The third is W.R. 
Hambrecht + Co.’s OpenIPO, which was introduced in 1999 and has 
become the sole domestic platform for Dutch IPOs.237  This Part analyzes 
each example in relation to traditional IPOs to assess their comparative 
performance, and then introduces auction-specific manipulative 
strategies. 
 
A. Dutch, French, or Open? 
 
On April 29, 2004 Google filed an S-1 for an IPO to raise up to 
$2.72 billion.238  The S-1 raised eyebrows on Wall Street by announcing 
that Google had elected to conduct the offering via an auction rather than 
the far more prevalent bookbuilding method.239  Co-founders Larry Page 
and Sergey Brin portrayed themselves as sort of corporate Robin 
                                                                                                                                  
Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 1381 (1985).  And the 
French have been using auction-based IPOs since 1964.  See, e.g., John G. McDonald & 
Bertrand C. Jacquillat, Pricing of Initial Equity Issues:  The French Sealed-Bid Auction, 
47 J. BUS. 37, 37 (1974) (“In France all initial issues of common stock since 1964 have 
been priced and allocated in a sealed-bid auction procedure . . . .”).  But see Ann E. 
Sherman, IPOs and Long-Term Relationships:  An Advantage of Bookbuilding, 13 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 697, 697 (2000) (noting that “[t]here is an international trend toward use of 
the U.S. book-building (firm commitment) method for initial public offerings” and “that 
auctions have not been more popular” [globally]”); Ruth Simon & Elizabeth Weinstein, 
Investors Eagerly Anticipate Google’s IPO -- Dutch Auction-Type Process May Give 
Smaller Bidders a More Level Playing Field, Apr. 30, 2004, WALL ST. J., at C1 
(“‘Around the world, auctions have fallen out of favor,’ says Alexander Ljungqvist, a 
finance professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business.”). 
236 See, e.g., Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 168, at 2 (“In the Mise en Vente, 
an auction-like IPO commonly used in France, investors submit limit orders and the 
auctioneer sets the price as a function of aggregate demand (the name of this auction 
procedure has been recently changed to Offre a Prix Minimum, but its workings have not 
been altered).”).  See also infra Part III.A. 
237 See, e.g., Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 10) 
(“[O]f the firms that developed an online auction system during the 1999-2000 Boom, 
only W.R. Hambrecht + Co. currently maintains an online IPO platform in the U.S.”). 
238 See Google, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement, http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm (filed with SEC on Apr. 29, 
2004) [hereinafter Google, Form S-1].  See also Fleischer, supra note 34 (manuscript at 
22) (noting that the precise amount to be raised, $2,718,281,828, is the same numerical 
sequence of “the mathematical constant e, or Euler’s number, which is the base of the 
natural logarithm function” and that “Google repeated the joke in its follow-on offering 
in August 2005, selling 14,159,265 shares.  The number represents the first eight digits 
after the decimal in the mathematical constant pi”). 
239 Google, Form S-1, supra note 238, at 2 (The price to the public and allocation of 
shares will be determined by an auction process.”).  Bookbuilding was the preferred 
method for IPOs during the internet bubble.  See, e.g., Loughran & Ritter, supra note 71, 
at 8 (noting that, within their 1999-2000 data set, “[b]ookbuilding is the mechanism used 
to price and allocate IPOs for 99.9% . . . with auctions used for the other 0.1%.”). 
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Hoods,240 rejecting bookbuilding in favor of a method that seemed to 
promise less underpricing, less restricted access to the IPO, and less 
profit for privileged recipients of spun shares.241  Indeed, within the 
initial S-1 filing, they pointed out that:  “Buyers hoping to capture profits 
shortly after our Class A common stock begins trading may be 
disappointed.”242 
Google’s announcement, however, certainly did not generate 
disappointing media coverage.  As one prominent market strategist 
proclaimed, “We are in a new world.”243  A financial columnist from The 
New Yorker described the auction as “analogous to the new-model 
I.P.O.:  forget the experts; go with the crowd.  You might say that 
Google could Google its own stock price,”244 while a commentator 
suggested that this method “may push out the old model and become the 
industry standard.”245  The CEO of another company that had used an 
auction to go public speculated that Google’s IPO “could be the thing 
that breaks a sleazy Wall Street system.”246  And reports predicted that 
“[t]his type of auction should cut down on the huge run-up in share price 
                                                          
240 This decision appeared to be a calculated move to capitalize on the co-founders’ 
iconoclastic personalities and management style.  See, e.g., Google’s Dutch Treat, WALL 
ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A20 (“In a sense, this auction is the perfect IPO expression of 
Google’s own business model.”); George Mannes, Partner Pay Intrudes on Google 
Fantasy 1, http://www.thestreet.com/tech/georgemannes/10157744.html. (Apr. 30, 2004) 
(“[T]he picture [Brin and Page] paint of how Google is run, and how it should be run, 
more closely resembles the candy manufacturer run by Willy Wonka in Roald Dahl’s 
classic children’s book Charlie and the Chocolate Factory. . . . The parallels between 
Wonka and Google’s founders are striking.”). 
241 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.  This is not inconsistent with my 
earlier critique of the empirical and theoretical connection between underpricing and 
spinning, which is largely predicated on the incentives applying to issuer-managers.  See 
supra Part I.B. 
242 Google, Form S-1, supra note 238, at 2.  A subsequent amendment to the S-1, 
however, deleted the reference to being “disappointed” and inserted the following 
substitute language:  “The price to the public and allocation of shares will be determined 
by an auction process. . . . As a result, buyers should not expect to be able to sell their 
shares for a profit shortly after our Class A common stock begins trading.”  Google, 
Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 31 (emphasis added). 
243 Simon & Weinstein, supra note 235, at C1 (quoting Richard Peterson, chief 
market strategist for Thomson Financial). 
244 James Surowiecki, Going Dutch, 79 THE NEW YORKER 62, 62 (Dec. 22 & 29, 
2003). 
245 Bruce Gottlieb, What Is a Dutch Auction IPO?, http://slate.msn.com/id/1002736 
(May 6, 1999). 
246 Bill Mann, Going Dutch with Google, http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/ 
2004/commentary040526bm.htm (May 26, 2004) (quoting Patrick Byrne of 
Overstock.com); see also Olga Kharif, Not All Dutch Auctions Are Equal, BUS. WEEK 
ONLINE, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2004/tc20040818_5635_ 
tc024.htm (Aug. 18, 2004) (“‘The Dutch auction is definitely threatening the status quo in 
institutional banking,’ says Alison May, CEO of RedEnvelope [which had used a Dutch 
IPO].  ‘They’re fighting for survival.’”). 
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experienced during the first days of trading experienced by other tech 
IPOs during the 1990s.”247 
The method was appealing perhaps because its rationale is so simple.  
An auction is a familiar open access device.248  By allocating shares to all 
prospective investors, both individual and institutional alike, Google had 
stripped underwriters of their capacity to spin on a preferential basis.  
And by broadening pre-IPO participation, Google apparently had 
harnessed a more efficient gauge of its share’s market value.249  As a 
result, Google’s shares seemed less vulnerable to a first-day “pop” than 
those offered through the traditional bookbuilding method.  Accordingly, 
the auction promised an egalitarian way to eliminate spinning, and 
thereby avoid underpricing,250 that anyone could understand.251 
A closer examination of Google’s IPO,252 however, reveals a number 
of rather traditional features.  Rather orthodoxly, the company elected to 
enlist a syndicate of twenty-eight blue-chip underwriters;253 that 
syndicate was led by two of the most established investment banks, 
Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. and Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, and yet 
                                                          
247 Les Christie, The ABCs of a Unique IPO:  The Hottest Tech IPO in Years Will Be 
Run As a “Dutch Auction,” CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/29/technology/ 
googleauction 1 (Apr. 20, 2004). 
248 Classically defined, an auction is “a market institution with an explicit set of 
rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market 
participants.”  McAfee & McMillan, supra note 165, at 701.  According to Paul Milgrom: 
The simplest explanation of the continuing popularity of auctions is 
that auctions often lead to outcomes that are efficient and stable.  A 
second explanation of the popularity of auctions highlights the 
advantages of an auction to a seller in a relatively poor bargaining 
position (such as the owner of a nearly bankrupt firm) when the 
goods sold at auction can later be resold.  A third explanation . . . is 
that even a seller in a strong bargaining position will sometimes find 
it optimal to conduct an auction . . . rather than to play any other 
exchange game with the bidders. 
Milgrom, Auction Theory, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 1, 2-3 (Truman F. Bewley 
ed. 1987).  But cf. supra note 40. 
249 See, e.g., Kite, supra note 42, at 27 (“Dutch auctions, say supporters, offer a truer 
price based on more accurate demand of a wider market, because the issuance is open to 
any potential shareholder with an Internet connection, instead of select institutional 
accounts favored by individual underwriters.”). 
250 But cf. infra note 338. 
251 The mechanics of Google’s auction, however, were far from uncomplicated.  See, 
e.g., Google, Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 34-44. 
252 For a more comprehensive synopsis of Google’s IPO, see Eugene Choo, Note, 
Going Dutch:  The Google IPO, 20 BERK. TECH. L.J. 405, 418-27 (2005); Fleischer, 
supra note 34 (manuscript at 12-27); Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 
(manuscript at 11-26). 
253 See Google, Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 35.  Most of these 
underwriters rate extraordinarily well on reputational indices.  See, e.g., Carter et al., 
supra note 108, at 285 (examining three prominent reputational indices for underwriters 
based on underpricing).  Google also executed a standard agreement with its underwriting 
syndicate.  See Google, Inc., Form of Underwriting Agreement, http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/dex101.htm (Aug. 2004). 
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neither had any experience with auction-based internet IPOs.254  Google 
also rather quietly agreed to allocate to these underwriters approximately 
15 percent of the IPO shares outside of the auction process.255  Similarly 
well-positioned was a cadre of prominent individuals and institutions 
who had acquired ownership stakes well before Google even planned to 
go public;256 these shareholders stood to profit handsomely from the IPO, 
regardless of whether it would be by auction or bookbuilding.  And while 
Brin and Page did indicate that they were “encouraging current 
shareholders to consider selling some of their shares as part of the 
offering,” 257 their efforts in this regard evidently focused more on retail 
and small investors;258 this has prompted a charge that “some investors 
selling shares in the offering were more equal than others.”259 
Perhaps the greatest misperception about Google’s IPO is that it was 
a pure Dutch auction.  Well before Google announced its IPO format, 
there was rampant speculation that bids would determine the final 
                                                          
254 See Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 13) (noting 
that Morgan Stanley and CSFB “are not known for IPO innovation and in fact had never 
offered an online IPO auction before”). 
255 Choo, supra note 252, at 421 n.71.  The auction format, however, did enable 
Google to negotiate a significantly lower commission rate of 2.8 percent with 
underwriters.  See Gary Rivlin, After Months of Hoopla, Google Debut Fills the Norm, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at C4.  Cf. supra note 99. 
256 See Gary Rivlin, Google Goes Public?  The Rich Get Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 2004, at A24 (identifying as owners, inter alia, Henry A. Kissinger, Shaquille 
O’Neal, Michael S. Orvitz, Frank P. Quattrone, Tiger Woods, Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
and various venture capital firms).  These shares, however, fall outside of the conception 
of spinning used here, which concerns only pre-IPO allocations by underwriters to 
prominent individuals and institutional investors, but not initial shareholders.  See supra 
note 17.  Initially, none of these individuals and institutions was subject to a lock-up 
agreement.  See Google, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement, 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504105564/ds1a.htm 120 
(June 21, 2004).  Google subsequently backed off of this in response to intense public 
criticism.  See Google, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1 Registration Statement, 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504124025/ds1a.htm 110-
11 (July 26, 2004). 
257 Google, Letter from the Founders:  “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s 
Shareholders, in Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 31.  This, however, was based on 
the rationale that those shares would “supplement the shares the company sells to provide 
more supply for investors and hopefully provide a more stable fair price.”  Id.  In all 
likelihood any shares sold by these individuals and institutions were because they were 
interested simply in cashing out; to increase the supply of shares, Google merely had to 
authorize issuance of a larger number. 
258 See, e.g., Delaney, supra note 30, at A1 (delineating how certain prominent 
investors were allowed to fend off Google’s request to sell shares, which suggests that 
“some top executives and directors acted in ways that benefited them while leaving out 
investors who weren’t as well-positioned”).  To be clear, this is not to suggest that 
Google improperly used such strategic targeting.  Indeed, the practice of favoring 
institutional and prominent investors is legally permissible and has rational merit.  See 
infra note 338.  The point here is only that certain aspects of Google’s IPO seem more 
traditional than democratic. 
259 Delaney, supra note 30, at A1. 
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offering price.260  Google’s S-1 suggested the same, sandwiching 
between various caveats that:  “We intend to use the auction clearing 
price to determine the initial public offering price and, therefore, to set an 
initial public offering price that is equal to the clearing price.”261  In the 
prototypical Dutch auction the lowest bidder sets the ultimate price;262 
this format is ideally suited for sellers that wish to utilize market pressure 
to ferret out quickly the lowest valuation, regardless of the overall market 
welfare.263  Accordingly, Dutch auctions are a common way for issuers 
to conduct stock repurchases,264 and self-tender offers,265 where the 
ultimate objective is to obtain the lowest share price possible.  In contrast 
Google retained the option of setting the final offering price “in response 
to investor demand”;266 bidders thus had no assurance that the auction 
clearing price would in fact be the final offering price, which could be 
adjusted upwards or downwards as a matter of Google’s and its 
underwriters’ discretion.267 
Indeed, despite all its auction-related fanfare,268 Google ultimately 
lowered its initial clearing price range from $108-135 to $85-95, and 
                                                          
260 See, e.g., Pete Barlas, Google Files for IPO via Dutch Auction, http://www.10e20 
webdesign.com/news_center_press_coverage_investors_business_daily_google_files_for
_ipo_via_dutch_auction.htm (Apr. 30, 2004); Petruno, supra note 33, at C1 (“As the dust 
clears from Google Inc.’s market debut, some successful bidders for the stock believe 
that they might have gotten substantially more shares in the deal-if the company had 
conducted a pure version of the auction system it championed.”). 
261 See Google, Amended S-1, supra note 28, at 38.  This is not to suggest that 
Google mislead prospective investors, as the S-1 is sprinkled with well-placed statements 
that the company and its underwriters “have discretion to set the initial public offering 
price below the auction clearing price.”  Id.; see also id. at 34 (“Understand that we may 
modify the price range and the size of our offering multiple times in response to investor 
demand.”). 
262 See, e.g., Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 764 (“In the purest form of 
online auction, the underwriter has either no discretion or very little discretion in 
determining either the price of the IPO shares or the recipients of the distribution.”); Hurt, 
What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 6) (same). 
263 See supra note 167. 
264 See, e.g., Anita I. Anand, Regulating Issuer Bids:  The Case of the Dutch 
Auction, 45 MCGILL L.J. 133, 137 (2000) (“The Dutch Auction is a popular method of 
share buy-back in the United States.”).  Two months after the IPO, Google repurchased 
23.4 million shares of common stock from its employees.  While this was to mollify SEC 
concerns, the stock repurchase ironically may have been more suited to a Dutch auction 
format than the IPO. 
265 See, e.g., Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, The Relative Signaling Power of 
Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases, 
46 J. FIN. 1243 (1991). 
266 See Google, Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 34. 
267 See Google, Letter from the Founders:  “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s 
Shareholders, in Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 31 (“Our goal of achieving a 
relatively stable market price may result in Google determining with our underwriters to 
set the initial public offering price below the auction clearing price.”). 
268 See id. (justifying the decision to use an auction on the basis that it would 
generate “a share price that reflects an efficient market valuation of Google,” and thus 
minimize the amount of money left on the table) (emphasis added). 
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then set the final offering price at $85.269  This largely was prompted by 
investor uncertainty stemming from a number of snafus, ranging from 
SEC concern about employee share distributions to a magazine interview 
with Brin and Page that may have breached the mandatory “quiet” 
period.270  That uncertainty persisted into the days leading up to the IPO, 
leaving the offering still undersubscribed and reportedly leading 
Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt, to pronounce that “the auction had 
failed.”271  Accordingly, Google’s eleventh hour price changes were 
designed to ensure sufficient demand and generate an aftermarket pop,272 
a charge ordinarily leveled against bookbuilding underwriters.273 
Somewhat ironically, proponents of auction-based IPOs have been 
the quickest to point out the impure Dutch nature of Google’s IPO.  For 
instance, Laurie Simon Hodrick has noted that, “[a]lthough the Dutch 
auction gave Google the ability to set a market clearing price for its 
shares, the modified Dutch auction described in the prospectus did not 
require Google to do so.”274  Similarly, Christine Hurt has pointed out 
that “[i]n a true Dutch auction, the clearing price is also the offering 
price.  In the Google offering, the issuers . . . retained the right to set the 
offering price below the auction clearing price,”275 and ultimately 
asserted that “Google’s IPO was unique in that the issuer combined the 
auction platform with the support of traditional investment banks.”276 
The results, however, have been hardly unique.  Whatever 
mysterious method Google used to calculate its final offering price 
                                                          
269 Google further enforced this price range by reserving the right to refuse 
substantially higher bids, on the theory that they might be attempts to artificially inflate 
the offering price.  See Google, Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 34, 40. 
270 See, e.g., Choo, supra note 252, at 422-23. 
271 Delaney, supra note 30, at A11 (“In a conference call, according to someone 
familiar with it, Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt told executives and advisers that 
the auction had failed.”). 
272 According to Jay Ritter, 
by lowering its expected price range to US$85-95, Google probably 
triggered a last-minute rush by institutional bidders to the US$85 
level.  Even if demand still was good enough to allow a true market-
clearing price of, say, US$87, at that level Google would have 
excluded all of the institutions that had bid US$85, Mr. Ritter said.  
That might have alienated some key potential future buyers of the 
stock, he said. 
Petruno, supra note 33, at C1. 
273 See supra Part I.A. 
274 Hodrick, supra note 36, at 1; see also Choo, supra note 252, at 421 n.71. 
275 Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell, supra note 37 (manuscript at 22). 
276 Id. at 31; see also id. (manuscript at 33) (noting the uniqueness of Google’s IPO 
as “one of the largest in U.S. history”).  According to Hurt, “[u]nlike many start-ups, 
Google did not have to court investment banks or rely on VC relationships to make 
introductions.  Because of this power, Google was uncommonly able to determine 
unilaterally who would underwrite the IPO and how the IPO would proceed.”  Hurt, 
Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 769.  She thus contends that Google’s IPO was a 
“promising breakthrough in the market for IPOs in that the company showed the 
investment banks that it will engage in an IPO on its terms and according to its rules.”  Id. 
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clearly has failed to avoid underpricing.277  On its first-day of trading 
Google’s shares shot up 18 percent in value.  Table 3 demonstrates how 
Google’s stock subsequently has skyrocketed in value: 
 
TABLE 3 
GOOGLE IPO RETURNS, 2004-2005278 
 
DATE279 PRICE RETURN 
Aug. 19 $85.00/$100.34 18.05% 
Sept. 19 $117.49 38.22% 
Oct. 19 $147.94 74.05% 
Nov. 19 $169.40 99.29% 
2004 
Dec. 19 $180.08 111.86% 
Jan. 19 $197.30 132.12% 
Feb. 19 $197.95 132.88% 
Mar. 19 $180.04 111.81% 
Apr. 19 $191.40 125.18% 
May 19 $239.18 181.39% 
June 19 $280.30 229.76% 
July 19 $309.90 264.59% 
2005 
Aug. 19 $280.00 229.41% 
MEAN $215.94 145.72% 
 
Admittedly, Google’s stock has exhibited unusual volatility.  In the year 
after the IPO, favorable earnings reports escalated the stock price, which 
experienced a setback when employees and initial investors were 
permitted to sell their holdings, but then resumed an upward surge.280  
Nevertheless, over the same time period traditional IPOs have 
experienced only an 11.1 percent first-day return.281 
                                                          
277 But see Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 769 (“With the price of Google 
shares then soaring a modest 50 percent over the next six weeks, one is left to wonder 
whether even with the auction model, the shares were underpriced.”) (emphasis added). 
278 Data from http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/charts/chartdl.asp?Symbol= 
goog&DateRangeForm=1&PT=5&CP=1&C5=8&C6=2004&C7=7&C8=2005&C9=0&
ComparisonsForm=1&CE=0&CompSyms=&DisplayForm=1&D4=1&D5=0&D7=&D6
=&D3=0&ShowTablBt=Show+Table (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
279 There was no trading on the 19th day of September and December, 2004, as well 
as of February, March, and June, 2005.  The closing price on the last trading day prior to 
the 19th was used. 
280 See, e.g., Choo, supra note 252, at 426 nn.87-88, 434 (noting that Page and Brin 
sold approximately 500,000 shares at the time of the offering, and that prominent venture 
capital firms were in the process of cashing in over $5 billion in Google stock by the time 
the last lock-up agreement had expired).  Since the fourth quarter of 2005, Google’s stock 
has dropped precipitously due to (perhaps unduly) elevated expectations. 
281 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (Table 1, U.S. IPO Returns, 1980-
2005).  But cf. Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 37) (“In 
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These results largely have been replicated by a French variant of 
Google’s IPO, the Mise en Vente.282  In this type of an auction the issuer 
meets with investment banks to set the final offering amount and a 
reserve price approximately a week before the IPO.283  Prospective 
investors then submit bids and limit orders, which a central government 
body converts into a demand curve.284  On the day of the IPO the 
company sets the final offering price, which is the same for all investors, 
as well as a price ceiling; any bids above this ceiling result in no 
allocation.285  The purpose of the reserve and ceiling is to induce 
investors to “place bids that reveal their true valuation of the IPO 
firm,”286 since “the issuing stockholders bear in principle the price risk as 
well as the very small risk that the issue cannot be sold at the minimum 
                                                                                                                                  
addition, if the [Google] share price was underpriced, the underpricing was negligible 
compared to underpricing that could be expected of such an IPO in the hands of Wall 
Street investment bankers.”).  Hurt suggests that a fairer comparison would be between 
Google and “similarly popular technology IPOs,” and pointing to Dreamworks 
Animation SKG, which experienced a 38 percent first-day return.  See id. at 28.  Such a 
comparison, however, is hardly principled and is too limited to have any real utility. 
282 Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 168, at 12.  French issuers actually have a 
choice of three IPO types, two of which are auction-based:  the Offre à prix ferme, or 
fixed-price offering, and the Mise en Vente or Offre à prix minimal, or French auction.  
See, e.g., François Derrien & Kent L. Womack, Auctions v. Bookbuilding and the Control 
of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 31, 34-7 (2003); Bruno Husson 
& Bertrand Jacquillat, French New Issues, Underpricing and Alternative Methods of 
Distribution, in A REAPPRAISAL OF THE EFFICIENCY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 349, 351 
(Rui M. C. Guimarães et al., eds., 1989) [hereinafter Husson & Jacquillat, French New 
Issues].  The fixed-price offering is akin to the bookbuilding method in that the issuer and 
underwriter negotiate the offering price; prospective investors place orders and then 
receive allocations on a pro rata basis.  Derrien & Womack, supra, at 34.  The third type 
of IPO method is orthodox bookbuilding, or Placement Garanti, which is actually more 
popular than the auction-based methods.  See id. at 36.  This paper only focuses on the 
Mise en Vente as it is the only one that incorporates bids into the pricing process, as was 
the case with Google’s IPO and the OpenIPO.  See supra note 261 and accompanying 
text; infra note 297 and accompanying text. 
283 See, e.g., Derrien & Womack, supra note 282, at 34-35; Husson & Jacquillat, 
French New Issues, supra note 282, at 351.  See also Bruno Biais et al., An Optimal IPO 
Mechanism, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 117, 119 (2001) (“[T]he firm sets a reservation price 
and investors submit bids.”).  The pricing process begins months earlier, but consists only 
of discussions between the firm and its underwriter.  Husson & Jacquillat, French New 
Issues, supra note 282, at 351. 
284 See, e.g., Husson & Jacquillat, French New Issues, supra note 282, at 351 
(“[T]he banks and the brokers gather the bids . . . and transmit them to the ‘Société des 
Bourses Françaises’ (the governing body of the Paris Bourse–the SBF thereafter) which 
centralizes and process the bids.”).  See also Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 168, 
at 12 (“As in the Book Building method, there is no formal explicit algorithm mapping 
demand into prices.  But price adjustment in the Mise en Vente exhibits strong empirical 
regularities . . . .”).  Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet ultimately conclude that “the Mise en 
Vente and the Book Building methods have similar incentive properties and can reach 
similar outcomes.”  Id. at 14.  But see infra note 289. 
285 See Derrien & Womack, supra note 282, at 35 (“All bids greater than the 
maximum price are eliminated.  Although there is no written rule, it appears that this 
maximum price is chosen so that ‘unrealistic bids’ are eliminated.”). 
286 Id. 
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price.”287  Oversubscribed offerings can result in a postponement of the 
IPO or allocation on a pro rata basis.288 
There are a small number of empirical studies examining 
underpricing in the Mise en Vente.  An analysis of these IPOs from 1992 
to 1998 by François Derrien and Kent Womack has found an average 
first-day return of 9.68 percent.289  A more expanded study by Bruno 
Biais and Marie Faugeron-Crouzet has found average first-day returns of 
13 percent from 1983 to 1996.290  Similarly, a study from 1984 to 1991 
by Bernard Belletante and Remy Paliard has found those returns to 
average 16.4 percent.291 
Comparative analysis of these studies’ results reveals that the Mise 
en Vente does not clearly outperform traditional U.S. IPOs.  The Mise en 
Vente IPOs examined by Derrien and Womack did average less first-day 
returns than the 14.84 percent for U.S. IPOs during that period.292  But 
from 1983 to 1996 U.S. IPOs averaged first-day returns of only 10.80 
percent, which was less than the average for Mise en Vente IPOs found 
by Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet.293  Similarly, the average first-day 
returns for French auctions from 1984 to 1991 was more than eight times 
the 2.4 percent average of U.S. IPOs during that time.294  These mixed 
                                                          
287 Husson & Jacquillat, French New Issues, supra note 282, at 351.  Meanwhile, the 
company’s investment bank remains in the background, prepared to purchase or sell the 
securities if their price requires stabilization.  See Bertrand C. Jacquillat et al., French 
Auctions of Common Stock:  New Issues, 1966-1974, 2 J. BANKING & FIN. 305, 307 
(1978). 
288 Id. 
289 Derrien & Womack, supra note 282, at 36.  Interestingly, the most effective 
method is the Offre à prix ferme, or fixed-price offering, which averaged first-day returns 
of 8.88 percent over the same period, while the French bookbuilding method averaged 
first-day returns of 16.89 percent.  Id.  French underwriters, however, conduct road shows 
and meetings with investors over a markedly more compressed timeframe than their U.S. 
counterparts do.  See id. at 37.  Moreover, French firms “tend to choose their regular bank 
as their lead underwriter,” in contrast to the competitive beauty pageant that is a 
hallmark, and arguably a strength, of American underwriters.  Id. at 58.  Accordingly, the 
underpricing data for French issuers using the bookbuilding method are likely an inferior 
reference point. 
290 Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 168, at 16.  An analysis of 60 Mise en 
Ventes from 1966 to 1974 found first-day returns of 2.69 percent that increased to 9.89 
percent after the first-year.  See Jacquillat et al., supra note 287, at 311-12.  Prior to 1983, 
however, “only 2 to 10 with an average of 7 companies went public every year in 
France.”  Husson & Jacquillat, French New Issues, supra note 282, at 350.  From 1983 to 
1986 those first-day returns increased to 4.00 percent, as compared to a 4.50 percent first-
day returns for French issuers using the bookbuilding method.  Id. at 360.  As a reference 
point, first-day returns for U.S. IPOs from 1983 to 1986 averaged 6.56 percent.  Ritter, 
supra note 2, at 9. 
291 Benoît F. Leleux, Post-IPO Performance:  A French Appraisal, 14 FIN. 79, 85 
(1993) (citing Bernard Belletante & Remy Paliard, Does Knowing Who Sells Matter in 
IPO Pricing?  The French Second Market Experience, 14 CAHIERS LYONNAIS DE 
RECHERCHE EN GESTION 42 (1993)). 
292 Compare Ritter, supra note 2, at 9, with Derrien & Womack, supra note 282, at 
36. 
293 Compare Ritter, supra note 2, at 9, with Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 
168, at 16. 
294 Compare Ritter, supra note 2, at 9, with Leleux, supra note 291, at 85. 
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results can be summarized fairly by the conclusion reached by Biais and 
Faugeron-Crouzet for their own study, which is that the Mise en Vente 
appears to experience underpricing “very similar to those [underpricing 
levels] observed in the United States in the context of the Book Building 
procedure.”295 
Google’s IPO is not the only domestic exception to bookbuilding.  
Since 1999 Hambrecht has taken firms public using a patented auction 
mechanism known as OpenIPO.296  Prospective investors submit bids one 
to two weeks prior to the offering’s effective date, and Hambrecht 
proceeds to calculate a clearing price.297  As with Google, OpenIPO 
issuers typically reserve the discretion to set a final offering price 
different than the clearing price.298  At the same time Hambrecht reserves 
the right to screen bids for fraud: 
W.R. Hambrecht + Co may reject bids that it believes 
could have a manipulative, disruptive or otherwise 
adverse affect [sic] on the offering and reserves the right, 
under exceptional circumstances, to alter the method of 
allocation described here to ensure a fair and orderly 
distribution of the issuing company’s shares.299 
When the offering is over-subscribed, Hambrecht allocates shares on a 
discretionary pro-rata basis.300 
The OpenIPO touts four primary benefits for investors.  First, 
individual and institutional investors enjoy equal access to participating 
in an IPO.301  Second, these investors are permitted to submit multiple, 
                                                          
295 Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 168, at 16.  During the period examined 
by Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet the first-day return for all IPOs averaged 10.8 percent.  
Ritter, supra note 2, at 9.  For the Mise en Vente, price adjustment, or the ratio of final 
offering price to reserve price, averaged 17.4 percent.  Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra 
note 168, at 16. 
296 See W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO:  Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/faq.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) 
(describing the method as “[b]ased on an auction system designed by Nobel Prize-
winning economist William Vickrey”).  The patentability of this process, however, is 
questionable.  See infra note 382.  Hambrecht also advised Google during its IPO.  See 
Nocera, supra note 34, at 42. 
297 See W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO:  How To Place A Bid, 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/bid.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).  
See also Hambrecht, OpenIPO:  Pro-Rata Allocation, http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/ 
auctions/openipo/prorata.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006); Hambrecht, Sample Auction 
(Flash demo), http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/faq.html# (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2006). 
298 See, e.g., W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO:  How It Works, 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/index.html# (last visited Feb. 1, 
2006). 
299 See W.R. Hambrecht + Co., Sample Auction, http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/ 
auctions/openipo/pro_guide.html# (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
300 See W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO:  Pro-Rata Allocation, 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/prorata.html (last visited Feb. 1, 
2006). 
301 W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO:  How It Works, http://www.wrhambrecht 
.com/ind/auctions/openipo/index.html# (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
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multi-tiered bids that indicate variable interest levels in different share 
prices.302  Third, all investors receive the same price.303  And, finally, 
shares are allocated on an equal and impartial basis.304 
Since 1999 Hambrecht has completed fifteen OpenIPOs.305  Table 4 
lists their final offering size and price: 
 
TABLE 4 








04/09/99 Ravenswood $11.5 $10.50 
06/22/99 Salon.com $25.0 $10.50 
12/08/99 Andover.net $82.8 $18.00 
05/17/00 Nogatech $42.0 $12.00 
01/25/01 Peet’s Coffee & Tea $26.4 $8.00 
05/02/01 Briazz $16.0 $8.00 
05/29/02 Overstock.com $39.0 $13.00 
09/25/03 Red Envelope $30.8 $14.00 
10/30/03 Genitope $33.0 $9.00 
08/05/04 New River Pharmaceuticals $33.6 $7.50 
03/15/05 BofI Holding $35.1 $11.50 
05/02/05 Morningstar $140.8 $18.50 
07/14/05 Cryocor $40.8 $11.00 
09/28/05 Avalon Pharmaceuticals $28.9 $10.50 
11/17/05 Dover Saddlery $27.5 $10.00 
MEAN $40.9 $11.47 
MEDIAN307 $76.2 $13.00 
                                                          
302 Id. 
303 W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO:  Potential Benefits, http://www.wrhambrecht 
.com/ind/auctions/openipo/benefits.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
304 Id. 
305 Hambrecht was retained for a sixteenth OpenIPO by an online bookseller, 
Alibris, but that was aborted.  See, e.g., .Alan J. Berkeley et al., Some Background and 
Simple FAQs About Dutch Auctions and the Google IPO, SK003 ALI-ABA 239, 243 
(2004) (“There was apparently little response, and Alibris announced it was withdrawing 
the offering proposal.  One has to wonder if the Alibris offering could have proceeded 
and succeeded if there was a traditional active marketing effort through well compensated 
investment bankers . . . .”). 
306 Firm (Offering Amount $M) and Offering Price data from W.R. Hambrecht + 
Co., http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/completed.html (last visited Feb. 1, 
2006).  Pro rata distribution percentage data from W.R. Hambrecht + Co., 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).  Date 
and Return data for all firms except Ravenswood from Hoover’s Online, supra note 2.  
Date and Return data for Ravenswood from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 12, 1999, at 1, and 
NASDAQ, Daily Stock Price Record, Oct. 8, 1999. 
307 The median for returns was calculated with absolute values. 
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04/09/99 Ravenswood 89% 3.62% (2.37%) 
06/22/99 Salon.com 84% (5.00%) (99.05%) 
12/08/99 Andover.net 97% 252.11% 4.00% 
05/17/00 Nogatech --- (21.58%) (3.33%) 
01/25/01 Peet’s Coffee & Tea 72% 17.25% 113.00% 
05/02/01 Briazz 70% 0.38% (98.25%) 
05/29/02 Overstock.com 60% 0.23% 199.62% 
09/25/03 Red Envelope 56% 3.93% --- 
10/30/03 Genitope 89% 11.11% --- 
08/05/04 New River Pharm. 98% 0.00% --- 
03/15/05 BofI Holding 82% 0.00% --- 
05/02/05 Morningstar 65% 8.38% --- 
07/14/05 Cryocor 59% 0.90% --- 
09/28/05 Avalon Pharm. --- 0.00% --- 
11/17/05 Dover Saddlery --- 0.01% --- 
MEAN311 76.75% 18.09% 74.23% 
MEDIAN312 76.50% 126.06% 101.00% 
 
                                                          
308 Firm (Offering Amount $M) and Offering Price data from W.R. Hambrecht + 
Co., http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/completed.html (last visited Feb. 1, 
2006).  Pro rata distribution percentage data from W.R. Hambrecht + Co., 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).  Date 
and Return data for all firms except Ravenswood from Hoover’s Online, IPO Central - 
IPO Performance, http://www.hoovers.com/busines-information (last visited Feb. 1, 
2006).  Date and Return data for Ravenswood from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 12, 1999, at 
1, and NASDAQ, Daily Stock Price Record, Oct. 8, 1999. 
309 E-mail from Matthew Regan, Director of Brokerage Services, W.R. Hambrecht + 
Co., to Peter B. Oh, Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Aug. 
22, 2005) (on file with author). 
310 E-mail from Jay R. Ritter Cordell Professor of Finance, University of Florida 
Warrington College of Business, to Peter B. Oh, Assistant Professor of Law, William 
Mitchell College of Law (Aug. 1, 2005) (utilizing data from Center for Research in 
Securities Prices) (on file with author).  Returns for Andover.net, Nogatech, and 
Ravenswood are for less than three years.  Andover.net and Ravenswood were acquired 
by other corporations, respectively, in June, 2000, and July, 2001.  Nogatech merged with 
another corporation in October, 2000. 
311 The mean for returns was calculated with absolute values. 
312 The median for returns was calculated with absolute values. 
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Hambrecht has conducted roughly two OpenIPOs per a year.  These 
OpenIPOs have been distributed roughly throughout Hambrecht’s six-
year existence, with no unusual decrease or increase in number during 
this entire period.313 
As a preliminary matter, there are significant caveats to this data.  
The paucity of total OpenIPOs obviously accords each firm’s 
performance unduly significant distortive weight.  For instance, the 
average first-day returns for all OpenIPOs drops from 18.09 percent to 
1.37 percent if one excludes Andover.net, as some might be inclined to 
contend on the basis of firm-specific reasons.314  While the data could be 
restyled in such ways, the better approach is to regard Table 5 in its 
entirety as just a small statistical sample with a limited capacity to 
support causal inferences–either for or against Dutch IPOs.  This is 
particularly the case in light of the OpenIPO’s novelty.  The first two 
offerings conducted by Hambrecht–Ravenswood and Salon.com–
experienced low first-day returns.315  These results may be attributable to 
any number or combination of factors, ranging from relatively accurate 
pricing to market apprehension about the specific firms or the process 
itself; certainly this last factor comports with investor expectations for a 
first-day pop and the suggested explanation for the offering price set by 
Andover.net, the third OpenIPO conducted by Hambrecht.316 
Moreover, all of the data spans a period of time in which there were 
dramatically variable market conditions.  Five OpenIPOs–Andover.net, 
Nogatech, Peet’s Coffee & Tea, Ravenswood, and Salon.com–occurred 
during the anomalous internet bubble period, when investors and venture 
capitalists were particularly exuberant.317  Accordingly, even though 
these OpenIPOs’ average first-day returns of 49.28 percent were superior 
to the 63.3 percent of all bubble IPOs, the comparison is less illuminating 
than the fact that both types of IPOs suffered from extremely severe 
                                                          
313 Broken down by year, the number of OpenIPOs is as follows:  3 (1999), 1 
(2000), 2 (2001), 1 (2002), and 2 (2003), 1 (2004), and 3 (2005).  See supra notes 308-
310 and accompanying text (Table 4, OpenIPO Returns, 1999-2005).  See also Hurt, 
What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 10) (“As these numbers make 
clear, very few companies launch online IPOs, barely one or two a year.”). 
314 See, e.g., Biais & Faugeron-Crozet, supra note 168, at 5 (noting that, in 
Andover.net’s offering, “OpenIPO actually set the IPO price at a significant discount 
relative to the market clearing price, more in line with the rules governing the book 
building or the Mise en Vente than with those of the Dutch auction”).  But see, e.g., 
Berkeley et al., supra note 305, at 242 (reporting that Andover.net lowered its clearing 
price “to reduce the possibility of after market disappointment following offering 
exuberance and in an effort to build a loyal shareholder base”).  Admittedly, this might be 
a sufficiently principled basis to exclude Google’s IPO as well.  But that principle 
consists of a practice by (and, more precisely, the intent of) issuers using auction-based 
IPOs, rather than a feature of the method itself. 
315 See supra notes 308-310 and accompanying text (Table 4, OpenIPO Returns, 
1999-2005). 
316 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  But see Berkeley et al., supra note 
305, at 242 (“Of course, companies that select the Dutch auction approach are likely to 
self-select and be predisposed to the approach for collateral social reasons, be attracted by 
the novelty, and be willing to extend it extra tolerance.”). 
317 See supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text. 
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underpricing.318  The same caution applies to the four post-bubble 
OpenIPOs–Briazz, Genitope, Overstock.com, and Red Envelope–whose 
average first-day returns of 3.91 percent are superior to the 11.29 percent 
of all traditional IPOs from 2001 to 2005, but are more meaningful as 
reflections of that period’s generally scarce venture capital and 
offerings.319 
In any event the performance results for OpenIPOs are mixed.  By 
one account, Bill Hambrecht has said “that an auction with a first-day 
pop of 10% or more is a failure.”320  According to this objective metric, 
OpenIPOs on average have failed.  From a comparative standpoint, 
OpenIPOs have outperformed traditional IPOs over Table Four’s entire 
timeframe, 1999 to 2005, in terms of both first-day returns, 18.09 versus 
43.87 percent, and three-year returns, 74.23 versus 110.23 percent.321  
The results become less clear, however, when one segregates the internet 
bubble data on the basis that involve peculiar dynamics.322  Non-bubble 
OpenIPOs323 do average a significantly lower first-day return, 3.84 
percent, than traditional IPOs, 7.72 percent, over the same period;324 but 
the average three-year return for these OpenIPOs, 136.96 percent, is over 
six times that of traditional IPOs, 20.37 percent.325  The available data 
thus suggests that OpenIPOs–both non-bubble and overall–may be as, if 
not more, susceptible to unusually dramatic price changes–either positive 
or negative–than traditional IPOs. 
Arranging the data by offering size provides another interesting 
perspective.  The offering price for the average OpenIPO is $11.47 with 
a modest offering amount of $40.9 million, which drops to $33.7 million 
if one excludes the sizable Morningstar offering.326  While nine of the 
                                                          
318 For instance, even during the height of the internet bubble, SEC Commissioner 
Laura Unger cautiously observed that the doubling of Peet’s Coffee & Tea’s stock during 
the first week of trading, while “belying the notion that an auction ensures that the issuing 
company raises the maximum amount of money that the market will bear,” also “perhaps 
prov[es] that secondary market in IPOs is still vigorous.”  Laura S. Unger, Raising 
Capital on the Internet, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1207-08 (2001). 
319 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
320 Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 26).  Arguably 
the benchmark should be Hambrecht’s commission rate.  See, e.g., Ritter & Loughran, 
supra note 71, at 8 (“[G]iven the use of bookbuilding, the joint hypothesis that issuers 
desire to maximize their proceeds and that underwriters act in the best interests of issuers 
can be rejected whenever average underpricing exceeds [the standard commission rate of] 
seven percent.”). 
321 Ritter, supra note 2, at 9.  The comparison of three-year returns includes 
OpenIPO companies that were either acquired or merged beforehand, see supra note 310, 
and obviously does not include any post-2002 IPOs. 
322 See supra note 17. 
323 These are all the OpenIPOs that did not occur during the internet bubble period. 
324 Ritter, supra note 2, at 9. 
325 Id. 
326 Cf. supra note 314.  But cf. Christopher Windham, Dutch Auction IPOs Could 
Lure More Takers; Attraction Grows as Google Hits $300 a Share, 17 INV. DEALERS DIG. 
13, 14  (2005) (“Equities observers believe Morningstar’s IPO more accurately portrays a 
successful Dutch auction IPO.”). 
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twelve OpenIPOs experienced first-day returns under five percent, the 
three largest OpenIPOs–Andover.net, Morningstar, and Nogatech–all 
experienced significant pops or drops on the first-day of trading.327  This 
at least comports with numerous studies finding auction returns may be 
affected by larger offerings, which may include more risk-seeking or 
uninformed investors.328 
In sum the empirical evidence on auction-based IPOs hardly 
constitutes resounding proof of their superiority over traditional 
bookbuilding.  Of the three groups analyzed, the most comprehensive 
data set comes from the Mise en Vente.  And the two most 
comprehensive studies of these auction-based French IPOs yield first-day 
returns inferior to those from all U.S. IPOs over the same period.329  
Clearly, these results also have not been even approximated by Google’s 
IPO, the largest such U.S. auction-based offering.330  The offering size, 
along with peculiar legal snafus,331 limits that issue’s utility as a case 
study or even a single data point.332  But the degree of underpricing is 
consistent with the data for OpenIPOs in suggesting that larger offerings 
tend to suffer from greater levels of inaccurate pricing and larger 
fluctuations in value over the long-run.333  Comprehensive data 
eventually may be available to test reliably these tentative conclusions.  
At the very least, however, the data presented here fails to demonstrate 
conclusively that auction-based IPOs price newly issued shares more 
                                                          
327 There is no correlation between the size of the offering and the amount of 
underpricing.  While only slightly smaller than Nogatech’s, the Overstock.com and 
Cryocor OpenIPOs experienced minimal underpricing. 
328 See, e.g., Anita Indira Anand, Is the Dutch Auction IPO a Good Idea? (Sept. 
2005) (manuscript at 11-12) (“Retail shareholders . . .have a greater impact on pricing in 
a Dutch auction than they would have in a traditional underwritten offering.  Because of 
their lack of sophistication, these investors can make the market less efficient.”), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=794464.  See also generally Ann E. Sherman, 
Global Trends in IPO Methods:  Book Building Versus Auctions with Endogenous Entry  
(Dec. 2004) (finding auctions with larger pools of bidders are susceptible to more 
inaccurate pricing), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=276124. 
329 See supra notes 290-291, 293-294, and accompanying text. 
330 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
331 See, e.g., Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us, supra note 37 (manuscript at 33) 
(“Unfortunately, Google does not make a perfect poster child for auctions, either pro or 
con, because of Google’s uniqueness as an issuer.  Among other characteristics, the 
Google offering was one of the largest in U.S. history.”); Windham, supra note 326, at 14 
(“[T]he Google brand was widely recognized and thus already on the radar of most 
investors.  ‘This aspect made the IPO very unusual,’ says Jay Ritter . . . who as a 
consultant advised Google to use the Dutch auction method.”).  In particular Google’s 
cachet with household investors may have given the company unusual leverage in 
negotiating with investment banks.  See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 34 (manuscript at 20-
25) (describing Google’s popularly geekish and unorthodox corporate image); Hurt, 
Moral Hazard, supra note 37, at 769 (“Unlike many start-ups, Google did not have to 
court investment banks or rely on VC relationships to make introductions.  Because of 
this power Google was uncommonly able to determine unilaterally who would 
underwrite the IPO and how the IPO would proceed.”). 
332 See supra notes 268-276 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra note 328. 
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accurately than traditional bookbuilding, to the extent that underpricing 
is undesirable.334 
Far more certain is that the practice of auction-based IPOs does not 
square with the remaining claims of their chief proponents.  Prospective 
investors’ bids for Google, the Mise en Vente, and the OpenIPO are a 
significant, but ultimately only contributory, factor in the ultimate 
offering price.  Issuers in all these auction-based IPOs reserve, and 
almost invariably exercise, a discretionary right to set this price.335  
Moreover, Google’s ultimate allocation of shares both frustrated and 
surprised bidders,336 which is consistent with the variable pro rata 
percentages across all OpenIPOs.337  These two attributes of domestic 
auction-based IPOs severely compromise their popular image as a more 
democratic process.338  And while all successful bidders do receive the 
same offering price, not everyone is assured of qualifying to be a bidder.  
Reserve requirements for opening an account, as was the case in Google, 
can be prohibitively expensive for retail investors.339  And while opening 
access to individual and institutional bidders avoids any systemic 
spinning, this concern largely seems pyrrhic due to the new and proposed 
NASD regulations.340 
 
B. Strategic Bidding 
 
Unlike English or ascending-bid auctions, Dutch and French bidders 
do not expose themselves to the risk of a true “winner’s curse.”  This is 
because the lowest bid wins a Dutch auction, and in a Dutch IPO the 
lowest bid theoretically determines the clearing and offering price for all 
winning investors.341  As the ultimate winner never pays more than 
                                                          
334 See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text. 
335 See supra notes 266-267, 285-286, 298, and accompanying text. 
336 See supra note 33. 
337 See supra note 309 and accompanying text.  Data on pro rata percentages for the 
Mise en Vente are not available. 
338 A more fundamental question, beyond the scope of this paper, is whether greater 
democracy in the IPO process is desirable, much less efficient.  Anita Anand has 
provided persuasive challenges in this regard.  Specifically, she contends that Dutch IPOs 
may be inferior to bookbuilding in price discovery due to increased noise from greater 
inclusion of unsophisticated retail investors.  See Anand, supra note 328 (manuscript at 
10-12, 22-24).  She also contends that offering markets, when understood as a public 
good, already are well-protected by existing fiduciary duties.  See Anand, supra note 328 
(manuscript at 32-34); see also supra note 126.  I agree with Anand that completely 
displacing bookbuilding with Dutch IPOs, as some have advocated, see supra notes 39, 
44, and accompanying text, is unnecessary (if not unjustified), especially when the “most 
efficient offering mechanism will surely vary by issuer,” Anand, supra note 328 
(manuscript at 33). 
339 See, e.g., Choo, supra note 252, at 418-27. 
340 See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text. 
341 In Dutch IPOs issuers invariably reserve the discretion to set the final offering 
price, but this price usually takes into account prospective investors’ bids as a proxy for 
market demand.  See supra notes 266-267, 298, and accompanying text. 
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anyone else,342 a bid reflects a belief about what an IPO share’s ultimate 
offering price will be, and not that prospective investor’s true 
valuation.343  There is thus no regret in the orthodox sense. 
Dutch IPO bidders instead risk their allocations.  Prospective 
investors who submit a bid higher than the clearing price may receive 
only a portion of the requested share allocation.  Indeed, that may be the 
case even for prospective investors who submit a bid that matches the 
clearing price.344  Unfortunately, the mechanism for allocating shares is 
opaque, since neither Google nor Hambrecht has publicized their 
respective processes,345 presumably to avoid facilitating the means for 
committing fraud.346  In this vein both Google and OpenIPOs feature 
policies reserving the right to ignore bids that appear to be part of a 
manipulative price strategy.347 
There are, however, other ways to undermine a Dutch IPO.  The 
linchpin is the extent to which an issuer factors prospective investors’ 
bids into the clearing price.  Even when an issuer reserves the right to set 
that price,348 the role given to a prospective investor’s preferred price and 
allocation is a central point of distinction between the Dutch IPO and the 
bookbuilding methods.349  Indeed, this is a characteristic often cited in 
support of the claim that the method can democratize the public offering 
process.350 
                                                          
342 Bids less than or well above the final clearing price will yield no allocation.  To 
be sure, such a bidder will experience regret, but not of the winner’s sort. 
343 But see Dorton, supra note 235, at 1391 (“[B]idders in an auction have incentives 
to value the securities accurately.  In an appropriately designed auction, the fear of losing 
a desirable purchase opportunity discourages undervaluation.  Any tendency to overvalue 
the securities is countered by the fear of paying more than the securities are worth.”). 
344 But see Anand, supra note 328 (manuscript at 13) (contending that bids in excess 
of one’s true valuation may increase the probability of actually receiving an allocation, 
and may be a manipulative strategy). 
345 But see Biais & Faugeron-Crozet, supra note 168, at 14 (mathematically defining 
the price function in a Mise en Vente). 
346 Google, Form S-1, supra note 238, at 25.  Hambrecht also protects its process 
with a patent.  See infra note 249. 
347 See Google, Amended Form S-1, supra note 28, at 34; W.R. Hambrecht + Co., 
Sample Auction, http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/pro_guide.html# 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
348 See supra notes 266-267, 298, and accompanying text. 
349 See supra notes 42, 249, 302, and accompanying text. 
350 William Hambrecht, for instance, has presented the Dutch IPO as a method that 
“replac[es] arbitrary pricing and preferential allocation with a system that objectively 
establishes the full demand curve for an IPO and allocates to those investors willing to 
pay the highest price.”  William R. Hambrecht, Request for Comment on the Proposed 
Rule Governing Allocations and Distributions of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/bill_pov/200401/wrhco20040107.pdf 6 (Jan. 
7, 2004); see also Hambrecht, supra note 11, at 2-3 (advocating that “underwriters use an 
open auction or some other mechanism that allows non-preferential allocation to 
determine the full demand curve for an offering and to price the IPO based on that 
information”). 
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Democracy is not cheap, and its price comes in a corresponding 
ability of prospective investors to bid their allocations strategically.351  
Various models have demonstrated that, “under certain scenarios, . . . a 
rational bidder will profit from lowering the amount of shares it offers to 
buy in the IPO.”352  In essence requesting a smaller allocation can affect 
the market demand, thereby altering the clearing price to increase the 
strategic bidder’s utility.353  Bidders should engage in this strategy when 
that increased utility exceeds the costs of going into the aftermarket and 
purchasing the remaining shares to meet her original demand.354  To 
accomplish this bidders must estimate the equilibrium price in an 
untainted auction, gauge market elasticity, and request a sizable 
allocation of shares, all of which “[f]airly sophisticated investors, such as 
investor bankers, are well positioned to calculate” and do.355  In this way 
bidders can manipulate the allocation process, possibly resulting in 
underpriced shares and diminished issuer proceeds.356 
                                                          
351 This is consistent with the relationship between risk and value.  See supra notes 
343-344 and accompanying text. 
352 Mira Ganor, A Proposal to Restrict Manipulative Strategy in Auction IPOs 13 
(July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=52243; see also Biais & Faugeron-
Crozet, supra note 168, at 5 (“In [the Dutch] auction, bidders can tacitly collude by 
placing demand functions such that the market clearing price is very low, and such that, 
any attempt to bid more aggressively, to gain market share, would push prices too high to 
be attractive.”). 
353 See, e.g., Biais & Faugeron-Crozet, supra note 168, at 5 (“[T]he optimal strategy 
of the investors is to shade their bids rather than to ‘make a bid at the maximum price at 
which they are comfortable owning shares of the issue’ as advised on Open IPO’s 
website.”).  Provided Ph, the price at which an investor truly values a share, exceeds PIPO, 
the price that an untainted auction would produce, “the bidder must not lower his bid by 
more than half of his original amount to maximized the profits from the strategy:  Qd < 
½Qh.”  Ganor, supra note 352 (manuscript at 18). 
354 Ganor, supra note 352 (manuscript at 16) (“[T]he strategy always assures a 
profit.  This is because the bidder buys the same amount of shares, only now he does this 
in two stages–first in the auction and later in the aftermarket -- but he pays a lower price 
for some of the shares, and he pays the same price he would have paid without the 
strategy, for the rest of the shares.”).  Conducting an IPO via an auction thus meets the 
two conditions for profitable manipulation, “first, trading must cause the price of the 
relevant security to rise; and second, the manipulator must be able to sell at a price higher 
than the price at which the manipulator purchase.”  Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, 
Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 
512 (1991).  But see generally Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of 
Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1994) (contending that manipulation 
is not self-deterring, and that trades occasionally can affect prices).  These conditions 
pertain to aftermarket trading, but the point here is that an auction introduces the problem 
of manipulation at the pre-IPO stage in a way that arguably is not self-deterring. 
355 Ganor, supra note 352 (manuscript at 17); see also Biais & Faugeron-Crozet, 
supra note 168, at 11-12 (contending that “the residual supply function faced by each 
investor is rather inelastic” in a pure Dutch auction).  Ganor rightly points out that 
“[s]ome variations on the Dutch IPO auction make it even easier for the investors to 
calculate these variables.”  Id. at 18 n.30 (citing Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra 
note 37, at 54 (“During [the Wit Capital Corporation] auction, any Internet user could 
view the aggregate demand in the auction at each price point, making the pricing of the 
shares virtually transparent.”)). 
356 See, e.g., Ganor, supra note 352 (manuscript at 20). 
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This reduced allocation strategy works around an auction-based 
IPO’s primary antifraud devices.  The strategic bidder only scales back 
the requested allocation of shares, and not the requested price, which 
may make detecting such strategic bidding rather difficult.357  An issuer 
might be able to compare a prospective investor’s bid across various 
IPOs, but this may incur prohibitively high search and enforcement costs.  
More visible is when the strategic bidder goes into the aftermarket to 
purchase additional shares, but, “without the bidder trading on the days 
following the IPO, the restricted strategy cannot be detected . . . .”358  
The same holds true for a lock-up agreement or regulatory restriction on 
aftermarket purchases.  Such prohibitions would diminish the number of 
strategic bidders, but there still would be some whose expected utility 
would exceed the cost of waiting until their right to purchase shares is 
restored.  And instituting a reserve price is likely to be ineffective.359  
Since the clearing price is a function of the prospective investors’ bids, a 
reserve price might distort the demand curve and thus is a risky 
prophylactic maneuver.360 
The reduced allocation strategy, however, may enjoy only limited 
success with existing types of Dutch IPOs.361  To be successful, strategic 
bidders first must be assured of receiving an allocation; this is because 
the strategy requires a precise comparison between the number of shares 
the bidder would receive in an untainted auction versus what the bidder 
expects to receive in the tainted auction.362  Only when equipped with 
this knowledge can the strategic bidder profit from reducing the 
requested allocation.363  This is easily accomplished in an English IPO, 
where the bidder with the highest valuation simply submits the highest 
price,364 the dominant strategy for obtaining an optimal Pareto 
equilibrium.365  In the case of both Google and the OpenIPO, however, 
allocations are based on a opaque formula in which market demand is 
just a variable.366  Payment is thus not purely a function of bids, and so 
                                                          
357 See id. (“[T]he strategy manifests itself only as an offer for fewer shares, and Qh, 
the real amount the bidder would ask for without the strategy, cannot be proven.”). 
358 Id. 
359 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
360 As Google demonstrated, altering the clearing price in the eleventh hour can 
engender heavy trading on the first day that may drive the share price either upwards or 
downwards, a negative signal for a Dutch IPO.  See supra note 320 and accompanying 
text. 
361 The analysis from both Ganor as well as Biais and Faugeron-Crozet concerns 
Dutch IPOs and properly focuses on valuation instead of price.  Both of Ganor’s 
illustrations, however, envision a strategic bidder with the highest valuation of an IPO’s 
shares, a scenario that is dramatically more complicated in a Dutch rather than English 
format.  The Dutch IPO, for instance, involves multiple sealed-bids that make it 
extremely difficult for a strategic bidder to know other people’s valuations. 
362 See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
363 See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
364 See Ganor, supra note 352 (manuscript at 10-11, 13-15) (presenting two 
illustrations in which the strategic bidder values the shares the most). 
365 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
366 See supra notes 266-267, 298, and accompanying text. 
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English and Dutch IPOs cannot be equated pursuant to the RET.367  
Further, the formula’s opacity,368 combined with the current paucity of 
Dutch IPOs, makes reverse-engineering difficult.  This erodes the 
precision with which bidders can reduce their requested allocations.  And 
by opening access to all investors, Dutch IPOs allow heterogeneous and 
irrational bids that cast some doubt on the ability of strategic bidders to 
reliably assess market elasticity and predict the final offer price. 
A simpler and superior scheme would be to form a bidding ring.  An 
elementary ring might involve prospective investors merely setting up a 
mechanism, such as a website, by which they can identify each other and 
share bidding information.369  That mechanism would collect and 
disseminate data on the number of parties interested in submitting bids as 
well as their preferred allotment and valuation of IPO shares.  This data 
in turn would facilitate the ability of all ring members to estimate market 
demand and execute a reduced allocation strategy.370  And, as the 
members would simply be exchanging data, and not coordinating bids, 
such an elementary ring would not require an agreement.371  
Accordingly, detecting such a tacit strategy would be extremely 
difficult.372 
More sophisticated rings might involve coordinated collusion 
strategies.  Prospective investors373 could agree to submit multiple 
bids,374 either as individuals or as a group, of different requested 
allocations and prices.  These bids can be of the actual or phantom 
sort,375 and spreading them can accomplish two objectives.  First, ring 
members can minimize the risk of receiving meager or partial 
allocations.  And, second, the bids can manipulate the demand curve.376 
                                                          
367 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
368 See supra notes 266-267, 298, and accompanying text. 
369 Sealed-bids were used for Google and in all OpenIPOs. 
370 See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
371 More sophisticated rings might prefer an agreement or some kind of arrangement 
to ensure that the members supply reliable bid information 
372 To be sure, an agreement would enhance the ring’s ability to enforce itself, and 
thus be stable.  But see supra note 221.  But a simple and noncommittal arrangement 
stands a better chance of attracting a larger pool of institutional and retail investors, and 
thus more complete market demand information. 
373 There is no reason why only prospective investors might be interested in forming 
a bidding ring.  Issuers also could submit actual or phantom bids to drive down the 
clearing price. 
374 Both Google and the OpenIPO permit prospective investors to submit multiple 
bids. 
375 See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.  Issuers also can submit “shill” 
bids, in which either they or their associates attempt to drive up the price and generate 
market demand. 
376 This manipulation is not restricted to lowering the clearing price.  Affluent repeat 
investors could benefit from a higher clearing price, which might diminish market 
demand and thus allow only purchasers of significant blocks of shares to take advantage 
of pricing spreads.  Moreover, highly sophisticated investors might attempt to manipulate 
the demand curve in an effort to glean more information about the issuer’s allocation 
formula and private self-valuation. 
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The problem inheres within every bidder’s profit function.  Provided 
the expected short-run or long-run return exceeds a prospective 
investor’s IPO valuation, there is an incentive to participate in a bidding 
ring.  In the short-run a ring member can benefit from either a simple 
discrepancy in valuation or an anticipated first-day pop.  In the long-run 
a ring member can benefit from future business with other members, 
either another IPO ring or some other unrelated venture.  Arguably, these 
incentives may apply most strongly to retail investors, who are often too 
disparate and infrequent participants in IPOs to act in a risk-averse or 
reputation-preserving manner.377  At the same time institutional investors 
may be better positioned to conduct the sort of subsequent, or knockout, 
auction necessary to distribute the ring’s proceeds. 
Regardless, bidding rings capitalize on a primary advantage of 
auction-based IPOs.  Under the bookbuilding method pre-IPO allocations 
are made on a discretionary basis to a select group of individual and 
institutional investors.378  Dutch IPOs, however, provide access to all 
investors; this creates a dual market in which non-ring members 
intermingle with, and thus disguise the presence of, ring members.379  
Broadening the pool of prospective investors diversifies the number and 
types of submitted bids, which suggests that bidding rings may be more 
likely to occur in bigger IPOs.  As a result, such IPOs may be more 
prone to polarized results, in which ring members succeed at the expense 
of legal bidders.  Accordingly, institutional investors might suffer less 
than retail bidders, who tend to be disproportionately uninformed and 
unsophisticated.380  Bidding rings, therefore, threaten to limit the ability 
of auction-based IPOs to deliver more democratic access. 
While scarce,381 some evidence of bidding rings does exist.  
Priceline.com, for instance, features a patented online Dutch auction 
process for travel-related services.382  Bidders name the maximum price 
and quantity they are willing to purchase, and the company’s engine 
matches these sealed-bids to the available supply.  This process, 
however, has been circumvented to an extent by an elementary bidding 
ring.  A separate website, www.biddingfortravel.com, has emerged 
                                                          
377 Again, to the extent that such investors are one-time or limited players in a 
bidding ring, there is a corresponding decrease in its capacity for self-enforcement and 
stability. 
378 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. 
380 See supra notes 328, 338, and accompanying text. 
381 See, e.g., Thel, supra note 354, at 280-81 (“Aside from being diverse and 
transitory, the details of common manipulative techniques are hard to discover.  The 
success of many manipulative schemes often depends upon the target’s ignorance . . . 
[t]hus, manipulative practices are likely to be disguised, and accordingly, they are hard to 
study.”). 
382 See, e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Abusing Intellectual Property Rights in 
Cyberspace:  Patent Misuse Revisited, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 955, 956-57 (2002) 
(noting that “[t]his patent purports to give Priceline.com the exclusive right to what is 
known as a Dutch auction, something that is hardly new or unobvious. . . . Apparently, 
the fact that a Dutch auction has never been done online makes this particular business 
method patentable.”). 
V.1.91 DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE THIS DRAFT WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 3/2/2006 
2006] THE PRICE OF AUCTION-BASED IPOS 57 
 
whose primary goal is “to promote informed bidding when using 
priceline.com’s (US) travel products.”383  Individuals post information 
ranging from failed and winning bids to re-bidding to anecdotal evidence 
about the engine’s mechanics.384  While the forum does prohibit bidders 
from attempting to re-sell winning bids,385 contacting each other or even 
setting up an alternative place to conduct a knockout auction is hardly 
formidable. 
In sum the use of auction-based IPOs introduces a unique set of 
manipulative tactics.  Both the reduced allocation strategy and bidding 
rings are premised on features specific to auctions.  By incorporating 
bids into the demand curve, issuers provide prospective investors an 
incentive to engage in strategic behavior, either by individually reducing 
their requested allocations or jointly sharing information and profits.  
These tactics, however, are largely inapplicable to issuers that utilize the 
bookbuilding method.  Through road shows and meetings underwriters 
construct a market demand curve based on information from pre-selected 
investors;386 because they tend to be known and repeat customers, they 
have a reputational interest in providing reliable information in exchange 
for issuer information or preferential treatment.  To be sure, the 
bookbuilding method is not immune from manipulation or fraud.  But 
auction-based IPOs introduce a different set of potential problems that 
should be discounted from this alternative method’s proponents’ claims 
and considered within any fair comparative assessment. 
 
                                                          
383 BiddingforTravel.com, http://p070.ezboard.com/bpricelineandexpediabidding 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
384 See, e.g., Beware of the Priceline Raise Your Bid Screen, 
http://p070.ezboard.com/fpricelineandexpediabiddingbiddingtips.showMessage?topicID=
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The movement for auction-based IPOs is a coalition of two groups.  
Some support this alternative method out of dissatisfaction with abusive 
allocation practices and astronomical underpricing levels during the 
internet bubble period.  Others support the method for its purported 
capacity to deliver a more efficient, egalitarian, and equitable offering 
process. 
Neither group’s set of arguments, however, presents a convincing 
case for auction-based IPOs.  Critics of bookbuilding have rushed to 
broad conclusions inferred from anecdotal and incomplete data that fail 
to engage extensive financial literature justifying underpricing and 
certain preferential allocation practices.  Further, the data on and 
mechanics of auction-based IPOs present a qualified and mixed picture 
in comparison to traditional IPOs.  And whether Dutch or French, 
modified or pure, auction-based IPOs are uniquely vulnerable to certain 
manipulative practices and bidding rings. 
The soundest conclusion for now is that we have not advanced 
beyond the findings of the blue-ribbon committee commissioned by the 
SEC.  Presently there is no clear reason to displace the existing 
bookbuilding method.  At the same time auction-based IPOs still 
represent an interesting possibility that bears closer examination.  Any 
appraisal of this alternate method should consider comprehensive sets of 
available data, interpret those results carefully, and utilize sound 
inferences.  When one considers the substantial stakes issuers, investors, 
and underwriters have in the public offering process, demanding concrete 
proof about an alternative method seems not only reasonable, but 
appropriate.  This article supplies the first step towards that goal. 
